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Emerging market economies have witnessed recurrent large-scale sovereign
debt crises. Many of these crises shared two features: a significant shift towards
short-term debt before a crisis, and a prolonged debt renegotiation afterwards. This
dissertation studies each phenomenon in a chapter. The first chapter constructs a
dynamic model of sovereign debt default and renegotiation in which the shift towards
short-term debt before a default results from two inefficiencies in the sovereign debt
market: no legal enforcement of debt repayment and no explicit seniority structure.
These inefficiencies give rise to “default risk” and “debt dilution risk”. The mech-
anism by which default risk favors short-term debt is well understood: long-term
bonds incorporate additional default risk, and hence bear higher risk premia than
short-term bonds, giving the government the incentive to rely more on short-term
debt before a crisis. “Debt dilution” occurs because the absence of an explicit se-
niority structure implies that new short-term debt issuances can reduce the amount
recoverable by existing long-term debt-holders, and thus “dilute” existing long-term
debt. This effect is more severe as default and debt restructuring become more
likely, resulting in higher risk premia on long-term bonds as a crisis approaches.
Quantitative analysis shows that the model generates a large shift to short-term
debt before a default. The fraction of this shift due to debt dilution is significantly
larger than the fraction due to default risk. In the long run, debt dilution tends
to increase default frequency, decrease debt-to-GDP ratio and make capital inflows
less procyclical.
The second chapter provides an explanation to the observed length of delays
in debt restructuring negotiations. Contrary to the common wisdom that delays are
costly and inefficient, this chapter argues that delays can be beneficial in that they
allow the economy to recover from a crisis and make more resources available to settle
the defaulted debt. As a result, the negotiating parties can be better off by waiting
and then dividing a larger “cake.” By introducing a stochastic bargaining game,
based on Merlo and Wilson’s (1995) framework, into a sovereign default model, this
chapter shows quantitatively that our argument can generate an average delay length
comparable to that experienced by Argentina in its most recent debt restructuring.
In addition, the model successfully accounts for the observed volatility of bond
spreads.
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Chapter 1
Debt Dilution and the Maturity Structure of Sovereign Bonds
1.1 Introduction
The past few decades have witnessed recurrent large-scale sovereign debt crises
in emerging market economies. Many of these crises were preceded by a significant
change in the affected countries’ foreign debt maturity structures: an increasing
reliance on short-term debt as a crisis drew near1. Table 1.1 reports the weighted
average maturities for some pre-crisis episodes2: Argentina from 2000Q2 to 2001Q2,
Brazil from 1997Q3 to 1998Q3, Mexico from 1993Q2 to 1994Q2, Russia from 1997Q1
to 1998Q1 and Turkey from 2000Q2 to 2001Q2. For comparison, we also report
these countries’ weighted average maturities from the mid 1990s to around 20023,
excluding the pre-crisis periods. In all the cases, average maturities shortened more
than one third in the pre-crisis episodes.
Excessive reliance on short-term debt is widely regarded as a key factor behind
emerging markets crises: it not only increases a country’s vulnerability to financial
crisis, but also affects the depth of a crisis when it occurs4. Why, then, do emerging
1This stylized fact is well documented in the literature. In particular, Broner, Lorenzoni and
Schmukler (2005) report such a shift toward shorter maturities in emerging markets debt issuances
before crises, using a newly-constructed database of sovereign bond prices and issuance.
2In this paper, a crisis refers to an episode with high default risk, but not necessarily an explicit
default.
3The time periods are: Argentina from 1993Q2 to 2001Q2, Brazil from 1994Q2 to 2002Q2,
Mexico from 1991Q1 to 2002Q2, Russia from 1993Q2 to 2000Q3, and Turkey from 1992Q1 to 2003
Q1. Data Source: Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2005).
4See, for example, Calvo and Mendoza (1996), and Cole and Kehoe (1996).
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Table 1.1: Weighted Average Maturities in Pre-Crisis Episodes
Country Pre-Crisis Episode Pre-Crisis Average Maturity Average Maturity Excluding
(Years) Pre-Crisis Periods (Years)
Argentina 2000Q2 - 2001Q2 6.46 9.77
Brazil 1997Q3 - 1998Q3 9.23 17.87
Mexico 1993Q2 - 1994Q2 4.87 11.59
Russia 1997Q1 - 1998Q1 8.79 14.67
Turkey 2000Q2 - 2001Q2 4.90 7.91
market economies near crisis rely more on short-term debt even when they end up
paying a high price for doing so? An obvious answer to this question is “default
risk”: since there is no legal enforcement of sovereign debt repayment, the borrowing
country has an option to default when its financial situation worsens. Since long-
term bonds are less likely to mature before default than short-term bonds, long-term
bonds have higher default risk and bear higher risk premia. As a consequence, long-
term bonds may become “too expensive” as a country approaches financial distress,
giving the government the incentive to rely more on short-term debt. Arellano and
Ramanarayanan (2006) employ this argument to show that debt issuances near crisis
are mainly in short-term maturities.
Default risk, however, is only part of the story. This paper emphasizes another
inefficiency in sovereign debt markets that also plays an important role in driving
the shift to short-term debt before crises. This inefficiency is the lack of an ex-
plicit seniority structure among different sovereign debt claims. Modern sovereign
bond contracts usually contain a pari passu clause, defining the priorities of debt
obligations. It typically takes the following formulation:
2
The Notes rank, and will rank, pari passu in right of payment with all
other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebt-
edness of the Issuer. (Buchheit and Pam (2003))
The Latin phrase “pari passu” means “equally”5, implying that this clause precludes
preferential treatment of debt obligations in a debt restructuring. While a few
exceptions, to be discussed shortly, do exist in practice, this paper focuses on the
“pari passu” case by assuming that all the debt holders share the debt recovery
value pro rata in a post-default debt restructuring. In these circumstances, “debt
dilution risk” arises. This source of inefficiency in sovereign debt contracts is less
well-known than the default risk problem, and is therefore the main focus of this
paper. Debt dilution occurs when a sovereign issues new debt that does not improve
the country’s repayment ability proportionally. As a result, these new debts not
only increase default probability, but also reduce the amount that can be recovered
by existing debt-holders in a post-default debt restructuring, and thus “dilute”
existing debts6. This dilution effect is in play as long as default risk exists. It
does not depend on whether the sovereign ends up defaulting. The dilution effect is
most severe when default and debt restructuring are near and the sovereign issues
new debts primarily to meet its growing financial needs. Consequently, long-term
5See Buchheit and Pam (2003), Bratton (2004) and Financial Markets Law Committee (2005)
for detailed discussions on the interpretations and applications of this clause.
6A simple numerical example can illustrate this idea: Suppose a sovereign has 100 dollars of
existing long-term debt (held by investor A) at the point of default, and the sovereign is able to
repay 80 dollars. Then the debt recovery rate is 80%. However, if the sovereign borrows another
100 dollars from investor B on the eve of crisis and after default, it is able to repay 100 dollars (i.e.,
the new borrowing does not increase the repayment ability proportionally), then the debt recovery
rate for both debt-holders is only 50%. Clearly, the new debt dilutes the existing long-term debt,
and investor A suffers a capital loss.
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lenders charge additional risk premia to cover the “dilution risk”, which leads to a
shift towards the relatively “cheap” short-term bonds when the government is near
financial distress.
The main purpose of this paper is to show, quantitatively, that debt dilution
plays an important role in driving the shift towards short-term debt near crisis, and
that debt dilution also has long-run implications for debt levels, default frequency
and cyclical dynamics. To this end, the paper constructs a dynamic model of default
and renegotiation of sovereign debt of short and long maturities and shows that
default risk and the debt dilution effect, together, bias the maturity structure toward
short-term bonds before crisis episodes. We then disentangle the effect of debt
dilution by comparing setups with different degrees of the dilution effect. Such a
comparison shows that the fraction of the shift in maturity structure due to the debt
dilution effect is significantly larger than the fraction due to default risk. This result
has an important policy implication: if emerging market economies want to improve
their maturity structures by issuing bonds of longer term, then the inefficiency of no
explicit seniority structure should be addressed first. Furthermore, the comparison
of setups with different degrees of dilution highlights the long-run effects of the
dilution problem: debt dilution increases long-run default frequency, decreases the
debt-to-GDP ratio and makes capital inflows less procyclical.
The analysis begins with a benchmark model, in which a risk-averse sovereign
borrows from a group of risk-neutral, competitive international investors using non-
contingent, one-period (short-term) and two-period (long-term) bonds. Facing a
stochastic output stream, the sovereign has the option to default, and default results
4
in exclusion from international capital markets and a proportional output loss. The
country can re-enter the credit market through renegotiation with the creditors over
debt reduction and repayment. In this post-default debt renegotiation, all debt
holders are treated equally and hence have the same debt recovery rate, which is
endogenously determined in a Nash bargaining game. In equilibrium, sovereign
bonds are priced to compensate creditors for both default risk and the debt dilution
effect, with the latter reflected in the endogenous debt recovery rate.
We characterize the equilibrium debt recovery rate analytically. The debt
recovery rate is decreasing in the amount of defaulted debt, indicating that the debt
dilution effect is more severe the more the country issues new debt on the eve of
a crisis. Furthermore, we demonstrate that for a given debt stock, the maturity
structure plays an important role in determining a country’s default probability: a
larger proportion of maturing debt leads to a higher default probability in the near
future.
The quantitative analysis shows that the model successfully accounts for some
of the key features of Argentina’s business cycle and debt experience, including the
volatility of consumption, the countercyclical current account, and countercyclical
bond spreads. We find that, by introducing the debt dilution effect, the model
can account for the default frequency and debt-to-GDP ratio observed in Argentina
without employing unusually high rates of time preference, as has been done in
previous quantitative studies of sovereign debt. The model generates a large shift to
short-term debt before crises. Moreover, by comparing the benchmark case of “pari
passu” (i.e., a moderate degree of dilution) with two alternative setups reflecting no
5
dilution and a maximum degree of dilution, we show that the dilution effect plays
a more important role than default risk in driving the shift in maturity structure.
This comparison also evaluates the long-run impacts of the dilution problem, as
mentioned above.
Although “pari passu” is the typical legal requirement, in practice there are
a few cases in which creditors are treated differently in terms of payment. Inter-
national financial institutions, such as the IMF, enjoy de facto seniority. They are
fully repaid even if the borrowing country is in default with its private lenders.
This “de facto seniority” issue has been recognized in the literature. For example,
Saravia (2003) studies the conflict between the official and private lenders in the
competition for repayments, given the de facto seniority of the former. This pa-
per focuses on privately-held foreign bonds issued by emerging market governments,
and thus abstracts from the “de facto” seniority problem7. Another counter ex-
ample to equal treatment is the “holdout” problem8. By refusing to participate in
debt restructuring and filing lawsuits against the debtor country, holdout creditors
hope to be repaid as specified in the original bond contracts. The holdout problem
has been widely regarded as disruptive to the normal debt restructuring process.
Consequently, different solutions have been proposed and adopted in recent years to
address this problem9. This paper abstracts from the “holdout” problem and main-
7Even if a de facto official senior lender is added to this model, the key result remains the
same: the existence of a de facto senior lender changes the interest rates charged for both short
and long-term bonds, but the shift towards short-term among the privately-held sovereign bonds
is not affected.
8The holdout problem is not a violation of the pari passu clause and can actually be an op-
portunistic use of that clause. See Buchheit and Pam (2003) and Bratton (2004) for further
discussions.
9For example, the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) was proposed by the IMF
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tains a key assumption in our benchmark model that all debt holders are legally
equal and share debt haircuts pro rata in the debt restructuring process.
Debt dilution is a familiar theme in the corporate finance literature10. These
studies generate considerable insights, which unfortunately may not hold in the
sovereign debt context because the debt dilution problem in corporate debt does
not result from the absence of an explicit seniority structure. Seniority of creditors
does exist at the corporate level and is established by contracts and statutes.
The importance of an explicit seniority structure in sovereign debt has be-
come the focus of recent studies. Roubini and Setser (2004, Chapter 7) provide a
thorough discussion of how sovereign debt restructurings could be made more or-
derly if a precise system of priority rules were in place. Sachs and Cohen (1982)
argue that without bond seniority provisions, a sovereign tends to overborrow, and
the new borrowing increases the default risk born by the long-term debt in effect.
Thus, short-term debt is more favorable under default risk. Bolton and Jeanne
(2005) use a 3-period model to show how creditors can achieve implicit seniority by
lending in debt instruments that are hard to restructure, resulting in a shift from
easy-to-restructure instruments (bank loans) to hard-to-restructure ones (bonds) in
equilibrium. The above papers are based on a static borrowing framework, in which
in 2002, providing a statutory approach to solve the holdout problem. Collective Action Clauses
(CACs), aiming to align bondholders’ incentives by specifying a majority rule, help to eliminate
the hold out problem by contractual means. These CACs have been recently adopted in many
emerging market bond contracts after Mexico’s pioneering inclusion of such clauses in February
2003. Even without the SDRM and without CACs in a large amount of defaulted debt issued
under New York Law, Argentina successfully avoided disruptions caused by holdout creditors by
taking legal action, which gained support from the United States government. See Bratton (2004)
and Gelpern (2005) for more details on Argentina’s experiences in dealing with holdout problems.
10See Fama and Miller (1972), White (1980), Schwartz (1989), Bizer and DeMarzo (1992), Hart
and Moore (1995), and Bisin and Rampini (2004).
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the defaulting country’s desire for future access to capital markets doesn’t affect the
outcome of renegotiation. In contrast, the model studied in this paper incorporates
endogenous default and renegotiation into an infinite-horizon dynamic model, in
which the debt dilution effect is introduced via the issuance of debt instruments of
multiple maturities. This setup allows us to study quantitatively the effects of debt
dilution before crisis and in the long run.
The present paper builds on recent quantitative models of sovereign debt de-
fault and renegotiation by Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2007) and Yue
(2006). These papers make significant additions to the pioneering theoretical frame-
work of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) to explain empirical regularities of sovereign
debt and business cycles in emerging economies. To date, however, this literature
has not explored the quantitative implications of debt dilution. We show that the
debt dilution effect can be very useful in filling important gaps that remain. In
particular, debt dilution plays a more important role than default risk in driving
the shift toward short-term debt before a crisis, and also the dilution effect helps
substantially in accounting for observed default frequencies and debt-to-GDP ratios.
This paper is also related to the literature on the optimal sovereign debt ma-
turity structure. Broner, Lorenzoni and Schumukler (2005) study this problem by
emphasizing changes in the lenders’ risk aversion and their liquidity needs. Arellano
and Ramanarayanan (2006) focus on the impact of default risk on bond term struc-
tures. Our paper differs from the latter paper in that we take into consideration the
debt dilution effect, an inefficiency associated with debt restructuring. We find that
dilution risk can explain a much larger fraction of the shift in maturity structures
8
before crises than default risk.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We describe the model
in section 2. Section 3 defines the model’s equilibrium and characterizes some of
its properties. Model calibration and simulation results are provided in section
4. In section 5, we compare the benchmark model with two alternative setups to
explore the significance of debt dilution. This section also presents the results of the
sensitivity analysis. Finally we offer concluding remarks in section 6. The proofs
and the computation algorithm are in Appendix A.
1.2 The Model
This model is based on the canonical framework of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981),
and follows Yue (2006) in modeling the debt renegotiation process. The model
differs from Yue (2006) in two main aspects: introducing multiple bond maturities11
and assuming a “pari passu” treatment of different debt holders in post-default
renegotiations. These modifications are critical in studying the debt dilution effect.
Dilution of the earlier long-term debt by the later debt does not arise if only one-
period bonds are traded and only one investor participates in debt renegotiations,
as in Yue (2006). In this section, we briefly describe the model environment and
then present the sovereign government’s problem, the renegotiation problem and
the international investors’ problem in detail.
The model studies a small open economy with a stochastic stream of a non-
11Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2006) also introduce multiple maturities to study the term
structure of sovereign bonds. But they do not model the renegotiation problem after default, and
hence the debt dilution effect is absent from their model.
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storable consumption good yt, drawn from a compact set Y . µ(yt|yt−1) is the prob-
ability distribution function of yt conditional on the previous realization yt−1. In
this economy, a risk-averse benevolent government maximizes the expected lifetime
utility of a representative domestic resident. The preferences of the sovereign gov-





where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, and ct denotes consumption in period t.
The period utility function u(ct) is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave,
and satisfies the Inada conditions.
In each period, the sovereign solves different problems depending on its credit
standing s at the beginning of that period. A good credit standing s = 0 indicates
that the country is current on its debt service and the government can then choose
whether to repay the maturing debt or to default. If the former is chosen, the
government maintains a good credit standing and maintains access to credit mar-
kets. On the other hand, if the government decides to default, its credit standing
deteriorates to s = 1 in the next period, indicating that the country is in default.
Default carries two penalties that are common in the sovereign debt literature, a
proportional output loss12 and exclusion from international capital markets. During
this exclusion period, the borrower initiates a renegotiation on debt reduction with
its debt holders. Once an agreement has been reached and the renegotiated amount
of debt has been repaid in full, the sovereign’s reputation is restored and it is no
12This assumption is empirically relevant. Sturzenegger (2002), for example, estimates the post-
default output loss using a panel of 100 countries, and finds that the percentage of output con-
traction is equal to 2%.
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longer excluded from international capital markets.
International investors are passive in this model. They are risk neutral and
behave competitively in international capital markets. They can borrow as needed
in capital markets at the world risk-free interest rate r, which we assume to be
constant and unaffected by the size of investors’ borrowing and lending. Investors
have perfect information on the country’s asset holdings and current endowment
realizations. They always commit to repay their debts.
Capital markets are incomplete in that only non-contingent zero-coupon bonds
with short (one-period) and long (two-period) maturities are traded. The face value
of a discount bond issued in period t and maturing in period τ is denoted as btτ ,
specifying the amount to be repaid in period τ . If btτ is positive, this reflects govern-
ment’s saving; otherwise, it reflects the government’s debt. We denote the price of a
bond with face value btτ as q
t
τ . This price is determined endogenously in equilibrium.
1.2.1 Sovereign Government’s Problem
At the beginning of period t, an endowment shock yt is realized, and the
country inherits a credit standing st and a vector of existing assets Bt from the last
period. Bt consists of 3 assets: the long-term bond issued 2 periods ago, b
t−2
t , the
short-term bond issued in the previous period, bt−1t , and the long-term bond issued
in the previous period, bt−1t+1. Let V (yt, st, Bt) be the country’s lifetime value function
from period t on when the current endowment is yt, the credit standing is st and
the set of existing assets is Bt. The government makes decisions depending on the
current state.
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If the sovereign enters the current period with good credit standing (s = 0),
then the country may choose whether to repay the maturing debt or to default on
it. Its value function is given by
V (yt, 0, Bt) = max{V R, V D} (1.2)
where V R is the value function for repaying debt, and V D is the value function for
default. If the former option is chosen, the sovereign fully repays the maturing debt
and then solves a standard consumption-saving problem by trading in short-term
and long-term bonds. Moreover, the government enters the next period with good
credit standing: st+1 = 0. Thus, the value of repaying debt is given by




u(ct) + βEV (yt+1, 0, Bt+1) (1.3)
s.t. ct = yt − qtt+1(yt, Bt+1)btt+1 − qtt+2(yt, Bt+1)btt+2 + bt−1t + bt−2t
Bt+1 = {btt+1, bt−1t+1, btt+2}
where btt+1 and b
t
t+2 are the short-term and the long-term bonds traded in this period.
qtt+1(yt, Bt+1) and q
t
t+2(yt, Bt+1) are prices corresponding to the short-term and the
long-term bonds. Bt+1 is the set of existing assets at the beginning of period t+ 1.
If the government defaults in this period, we assume that it defaults on all
existing debts. Following default, the economy suffers a proportional output loss γyt
and it is unable to borrow or save during default. The defaulting government then
enters the subsequent period with bad credit standing and a quantity of defaulted
debt, Bt+1. The value function for default, V
D, is thus given by
V D(yt, 0, Bt) = u(ct) + βEV (yt+1, 1, Bt+1) (1.4)
12





t )(1 + r) + b
t−1
t+1
To keep the model tractable, we use the risk free interest rate r, instead of a
bond-specific interest rates, to compute the present value of the defaulted debt, Bt+1.
The expression (bt−1t + b
t−2
t )(1 + r) captures the opportunity cost to the creditors of
not getting repaid on time.
When the sovereign starts a period with bad credit standing s = 1, it has to
settle its defaulted debt through renegotiation with the creditors on debt reduction.
Debt renegotiation determines an endogenous debt recovery rate α(y,B) ∈ [0, 1]. If
agreement is reached in the current period, we assume that the country immediately
repays its reduced debt arrears. It is then able to enter the next period with an
upgraded credit standing of st+1 = 0 and no outstanding debt:
V (yt, 1, Bt) = u((1− γ)yt + αt(yt, Bt)Bt) + βEV (yt+1, 0, 0) (1.5)
If no agreement is reached in this period, the defaulted debts remain unsettled and
interest payments accrue. Both parties continue debt renegotiation in the following
period. In this case, the value function of the government is
V (yt, 1, Bt) = u((1− γ)yt) + βEV (yt+1, 1, (1 + r)Bt) (1.6)
Default is preferable when V D ≥ V R. Thus, we can characterize the default
policy of a sovereign government in good standing by a default set yD(B) ⊆ Y ,
defined as follows
yD(B) = {y ∈ Y : V D(y, 0, B) ≥ V R(y, 0, B)}
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This default set specifies a set of endowments, for which default is optimal given the
debt position B. Consequently, we can compute the sovereign’s default probability
in period t+1, θt+1, as the probability that tomorrow’s endowment shock falls in the






1.2.2 Debt Renegotiation Problem
The debt renegotiation problem is modeled as a Nash Bargaining game. Due
to the static nature of Nash Bargaining, agreement is always reached in one period
in equilibrium. Therefore this model does not generate delays in the renegotiation
process.
We choose the threat point to be eternal autarky with a proportional output
loss of γy each period for the economy, and no repayment for the debt-holders. We
choose this threat point instead of one that allows future renegotiations because it
gives the sovereign the lowest possible reservation value, providing an incentive for
the government to agree to the highest possible debt recovery rate α. Note that
a larger debt recovery rate implies a smaller capital loss suffered by the existing
long-term debt holders, and thus a less severe debt dilution effect. Therefore, this
choice of threat point stacks the model against the dilution effect.
The sovereign’s expected value of staying in autarky from this period on is
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given by




The country’s surplus in the Nash bargaining game, ∆B, is the difference
between the expected value of accepting a debt recovery rate, αt, and the expected
value of staying in autarky forever13:




The sovereign can gain from settling the defaulted debt in two ways: avoiding the
proportional output loss once the defaulted debt has been settled, and regaining
access to capital markets after debt restructuring, which provides the opportunity
to smooth consumption in the future.
Regarding bond holders, we assume that they share the value of debt recovery
pro rata. Hence all enjoy the same debt recovery rate in the debt restructuring
process. This is consistent with our main assumption that all the debt holders rank
equally. Consequently, bond holders’ interests are aligned and we assume that they
act as a representative bond holder in the renegotiation process. We define ∆L to
be the representative bond holder’s surplus, which is the amount of recovered debt:
∆L(yt, Bt, αt) = −αtBt (1.9)
The amount of surplus each party extracts from debt renegotiation depends
on its bargaining power. A bargaining power parameter φ captures the institu-
tional arrangements governing the bargaining process in reduced form. The higher
13Alternatively, the surplus can be defined in terms of consumption compensation.
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bargaining power one party has, the more surplus it can extract from this game.
We denote the country’s bargaining power as φ ∈ [0, 1], so that the representative
bond holder’s bargaining power is (1− φ). The equilibrium debt recovery rate α∗ is
determined by the following Nash Bargaining problem
α∗(yt, Bt) = argmax∆B(yt, Bt, αt)
φ∆L(yt, Bt, αt)
1−φ (1.10)
s.t. ∆B(yt, Bt, αt) ≥ 0
∆L(yt, Bt, αt) ≥ 0
Note that the borrower’s surplus is expressed using cardinal utility functions,
so a change in units may lead to a change in the value of the equilibrium debt
recovery rate. However, the equilibrium properties of the debt recovery rate are
not affected by the units used, ensuring that the characteristics of dilution and its
impact on maturity structure are independent of the particular units used in the
utility functions.
1.2.3 International Investors’ Problem
The last part of the model specifies the international investors’ problem. An
infinite number of risk neutral and competitive international investors are ran-
domly chosen to trade with the sovereign government via one-period and two-period
bonds14. The trading investor chooses the face values of bonds to maximize its ex-
pected profits from both short-term and long-term bonds, taking bond prices as
14It is important to assume that the investors are randomly chosen. In these circumstances,
the sovereign trades with different investors in each period and hence the new investors do not










where πst and π
l
t are profits from bonds with short and long maturities, respectively.





















When btt+1 ≥ 0, the government saves by purchasing bonds. Since international
investors commit to repaying debts, there is no default risk on investors’ borrowing.
Therefore, the bond price is risk free. When btt+1 < 0, the government borrows by
issuing new bonds, and default and debt restructuring are possible future events. In
this case, the expected present value of repayment consists of two terms. The first
coincides with repayment in the following period, while the second reflects default.
As noted in the government’s problem, the probabilities of these events are (1−θt+1)
and θt+1, respectively. In the case of default, debt renegotiations ensue in period
t + 2. αt+2 is then the debt recovery rate agreed upon in the same period, due to
the static Nash bargaining assumption.























(1− θt+i) + θt+1αt+2 + (1− θt+1)θt+2αt+3
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From the first order conditions of the above maximization problem, we obtain the










if btt+1 < 0
(1.14)














if btt+2 < 0
(1.15)
Finally, note that default probabilities and debt recovery rates both lie in the interval
[0, 1], and hence the prices of both bonds range from 0 to the price of a risk free
bond. Consequently, the interest rates of sovereign bonds are always higher than or
equal to the risk free rate. We define the spreads of both bonds as the differences
between the country interest rates and the risk free interest rate.
1.3 Equilibrium
The recursive equilibrium of the model is defined as follows:
Definition 1 A recursive equilibrium is defined by (i) a sequence of allocations
of consumption c(y, s, B), short-term bond holdings b1(y,B), long-term bond hold-
ings b2(y,B), and a default set yD(B); (ii) a pricing function for short-term bonds
q1(y,B′), in which B′ is the set of bonds existing in the subsequent period, and a
pricing function for long-term bonds q2(y,B′); (iii) a debt recovery rate α(y,B) such
that:
1. Given the short-term and long-term bonds’ pricing functions q1(y,B′) and
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q2(y,B′) and the debt renegotiation outcome α(y,B), the country’s asset hold-
ings b1(y,B), b2(y,B), consumption c(y, s, B), and default set yD(B) satisfy
the government’s optimization problem.
2. Given the bond pricing functions q1(y,B′) and q2(y,B′), the debt recovery rate
α(y,B) solves the post-default debt renegotiation problem.
3. Given the renegotiation outcome α(y,B) and the country’s optimal policy, the
bond pricing functions q1(y,B′) and q2(y,B′) satisfy the investors’ maximiza-
tion problem.
1.3.1 Properties of the Recursive Equilibrium
We first characterize the equilibrium properties of the debt recovery value and
debt recovery rate conditional on default.
Proposition 1 For an endowment shock y and a defaulted debt stock B < 0, the
equilibrium debt recovery value α∗(y,B)B satisfies
α∗(y,B)B =

B(y) if B ≤ B(y)
B if B > B(y)
where B(y) is a threshold debt recovery value as a function of the endowment y.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
This proposition establishes the relation between the value of recovered debt
and the level of defaulted debt. If the country defaults at a relatively low debt level
(B > B(y))15, no debt is forgiven. If the country defaults at a sufficiently high
15Since the defaulted debt B has a negative sign by model construction, B > B(y) is equivalent
to |B| < |B(y)|.
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debt level, it repays the threshold debt recovery value regardless of the amount of
defaulted debt. Intuitively, such a threshold debt recovery value optimally splits
the total surplus between the sovereign and the investors in the bargaining game.
Thus, the government will always be willing to repay this debt recovery value as
long as it owes more than that amount (B ≤ B(y)). If the country owes less than
that amount, it fully repays its defaulted debt B. As for bond holders, they are no
doubt satisfied with full repayment when the level of defaulted debt is relatively low.
In the case of a high level of defaulted debt, the bond holders have to accept the
threshold debt recovery value, since it is the largest repayment that the government
would accept.
Proposition 1 also highlights the country’s incentive to borrow more before
crisis, if it already has a high debt level and default seems to be unavoidable. In
these circumstances, more borrowing doesn’t increase the amount of repayment in
the post-default debt restructuring, but may serve to postpone the crisis, which can
be beneficial to the country. A higher level of borrowing, however, incurs a larger
capital loss to the earlier existing long-term lenders through the dilution effect.
The next corollary establishes the existence of the debt dilution effect.
Corollary 1 For an endowment shock y and defaulted debt levels B1 ≤ B2 < 0,
the equilibrium debt recovery rate satisfies α∗(y,B1) ≤ α∗(y,B2).
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Corollary 1 follows immediately from Proposition 1. It demonstrates that the
debt recovery rate is (weakly) decreasing in the amount of defaulted debt. So the
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larger is the quantity of defaulted debt, the (weakly) smaller is the proportion the
sovereign needs to repay in a debt restructuring process, leading to a more severe
dilution of its earlier existing long-term debt. This result is obtained due to the
pari passu ranking of the debt holders. Given the equilibrium debt recovery value
characterized in Proposition 1, the larger is the number of investors that share this
recovered debt repayment pro rata, the smaller is the proportion each investor finally
gets.
As a crisis approaches, new investors perceive that they can effectively obtain
a share of recovered debt that would otherwise go to the earlier existing investors in
the debt restructuring. Therefore, the new lenders will not charge an interest rate
as prohibitive as would be the case if the new debt were legally subordinated. This
relatively low interest rate on new lending enables the sovereign to borrow more.
Equipped with both the incentive and the ability to borrow more, the government
may do so at the expense of the existing long-term creditors.
Even in tranquil times, when crisis is not on the horizon, the potential risk of
debt dilution impacts long-term borrowing. Long-term debt may be diluted before
maturing if bad shocks occur and the country issues new debt to postpone a crisis.
Thus, the possibility of future debt dilution discourages long-term borrowing even
in good times.
Although the risk of debt dilution exists in both booms and recessions, it is
more severe when a crisis is unfolding. Since this risk impacts sovereign borrowing
through the expected outcome of debt renegotiations, it has larger effects when
default and debt restructuring become more likely.
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Lastly, we present the relationship between the amount of maturing debt (given
the total debt stock) and the probability of default in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Given the equilibrium debt recovery rate α∗(y,B) and a debt stock
with the face value of BT , for maturing debt B1M ≤ B2M < 0, if default is optimal
for B2M then default is also optimal for B1M . Thus, given BT , the default set for
B1M , yD(B1), is (weakly) larger than the default set for B2M , yD(B1): yD(B2) ⊆
yD(B1).
Proof. See Appendix A. 
For a given debt stock, our model predicts that the government is more likely
to default as the quantity of maturing debt is higher. The intuition is that a larger
amount of maturing debt forces the government to seek higher levels of new financing
in the near term, at the cost of higher interest rates. When interest rates are
sufficiently high, the country’s total debt stock increases in the subsequent period,
leading to a higher default probability.




captured by the ratio of short-term to long-term debt. The higher is the ratio of
short-term to long-term debt issuances, the larger is the maturing debt for a given
debt stock in the subsequent period, and thus the larger is the probability of default.
A higher default probability, in turn, affects borrowing costs and hence the choices
of debt maturities by the government.
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1.4 Quantitative Analysis
We solve the model numerically to evaluate the quantitative significance of the
debt dilution effect.
1.4.1 Calibration
This model is calibrated to match various features of the Argentine economy.
We define one period as a quarter.





where σ is the risk aversion coefficient. This parameter is set to 2, a commonly used
value in real business cycle studies. We set the parameter of proportional output
loss γ to be 2%, based on Sturzenegger’s (2002) estimate, and the quarterly risk-free
interest rate r is set to 1%, following Yue (2006).
We assume that the exogenous endowment stream follows a log-normal AR(1)
process:
log(yt) = log(y) + ρ(log(yt−1)− log(y)) + εt, ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε) (1.17)
where y is mean output and is normalized to 1. The correlation coefficient ρ and
standard deviation σε are computed from the quarterly real GDP data of Argentina
from 1993 Q1 to 2005 Q4. GDP data are seasonally adjusted and are taken from
the Ministry of Economy and Production (MECON). The data are detrended using
a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. We then construct
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a discrete Markov representation of the endowment process as a 21 state Markov
chain, employing the quadrature procedure of Hussey and Tauchen (1991).
In the last part of the calibration, we set the time discount factor β and the
sovereign government’s bargaining power θ simultaneously to match the frequency
of default and the average debt recovery rate of Argentina using the simulated
method of moments (SMM). A higher discount factor decreases the frequency of
default and increases the average debt recovery rate, since a more patient sovereign
government cares more about its future consumption smoothing, and thus defaults
less frequently to avoid default penalties, including temporary exclusion from the
international capital markets and the proportional output loss following default.
Conditional on default, a more patient government is willing to accept a higher debt
recovery rate since regaining access to capital markets is greatly valued. A higher
borrower’s bargaining power raises the default frequency and lowers the average
debt recovery rate. With a stronger position in debt renegotiation, the government
is able to acquire more of the surplus and hence settles its defaulted debt with a
lower debt recovery rate. Consequently, defaults are less costly to the economy,
giving the government an incentive to default more frequently.
Argentina is a so-called “serial defaulter”, defaulting 4 times from 1824 to
1999 as documented in Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), and then defaulting
a fifth time in late 2001, resulting in an average quarterly default frequency of 0.70%.
The average debt recovery rate in the most recent Argentine debt restructuring was
approximately 35%16. As shown in Table 1.3, our calibrated model generates a
16In September 2003, the Kirchner government made an offer to bondholders involving a write
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default frequency of 0.72% and a debt recovery rate of 0.38%, which closely match
the target data moments.
The time discount factor is found to be 0.99%, which is in the range of stan-
dard values used for this parameter in quantitative RBC models and significantly
higher than those found in recent quantitative studies on sovereign default17. By
incorporating the debt dilution effect, our model is able to match the observed de-
fault frequency without resorting to unusually high rates of time preference. Debt
dilution amplifies default risk through its impact on the maturity structure: with
a moderate default probability, the potential risk of dilution aggravates the shift
towards short-term bonds, resulting in a larger ratio of maturing debt to the total
debt stock in the subsequent period, which leads to a higher default probability.
A higher default risk, in turn, makes the dilution problem a bigger concern. As
the equilibrium default probability is higher than in the case without dilution, the
default frequency is higher in the long run. This intuition is also confirmed by a
comparison of the benchmark model with an alternative setup with default risk only,
as presented in Section 5.
The bargaining power parameter is found to be 0.666, implying a strong po-
sition of Argentina in its recent post-default debt renegotiations, which is largely
consistent with our observations. The calibration results are summarized in Table
down of 75% of the defaulted debt’s value, non-payment of the past due interest, and the issuance
of new low-interest bonds, equivalent to a 90% hair-cut rate in the net present value of the bonds.
The Argentine Bondholders Committee made a counter-offer, accepting a write-off of 65% in the
nominal value of the defaulted debt and requiring payment of past due interest. The final offer in
2005 was roughly identical to this counter-offer.
17For example, the time discount factor is found to be 0.74 in Yue (2006) and it is set to 0.8 in
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006).
25
1.2. Table 1.3 compares the target data statistics and the model-generated statistics.
Table 1.2: Model Parameter Values
Parameter Value Sources
Coefficient of Risk Aversion σ = 2 RBC literature
Output Loss in Default γ = 2% Sturzenegger (2002)
Risk Free Interest Rate r = 1% Yue (2006)
Std. Dev. of Endowment shock σε = 0.047 MECON
Autocorr. Coef. of Endowment ρ = 0.83 MECON
Discount Factor β = 0.99 Calibrated
Borrower’s Bargaining Power φ = 0.666 Calibrated
Table 1.3: Target Statistics and Model Statistics
Target Statistics Data Model
Default Frequency 0.70% 0.72%
Debt Recovery Rate 35% 38%
1.4.2 Numerical Results on Equilibrium Properties
Figure 1.1 plots the equilibrium debt recovery rate as a function of the endow-
ment state and the ratio of defaulted debt to mean output.
This figure confirms the results of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. A positive
endowment shock causes the government to repay more to settle its defaulted debt.
Moreover, for a given endowment realization, the debt recovery rate is negatively
related to the defaulted debt ratio. No debt is forgiven at sufficiently low levels of

































Figure 1.1: Equilibrium Debt Recovery Rate
Figure 1.2 presents default probabilities of the subsequent period given that
today’s output realization is in the best and the worst endowment states. Once
today’s endowment is given, the default probability in the next period depends on
the debt position, including the total debt stock and the maturity structure. Figure
1.2 shows that the default probability increases as the levels of both maturing and
outstanding debt become higher. In addition, default probabilities are (weakly)
decreasing in output, implying that defaults are more likely to occur in bad states.
This is because in a bad endowment state, it is more costly for a risk averse borrower
to repay non-contingent debt, resulting in a higher incentive to default. This result
is consistent with observations in the data18.
Table 1.4 illustrates the relationship between next period’s default probability
and the debt maturity structure by a numerical example. In this example, the
endowment state is comparable to Argentina’s GDP in 2001 Q3, when Argentina
was near default, and the ratio of the total debt stock to mean output is fixed at 64%.


























































Figure 1.2: Equilibrium Default Probabilities in the Best (Left) and the
Worst (Right) Endowment States
We report default probabilities with different ratios of maturing debt to total debt
stock. The default probability is as low as 11.35% when the fraction of maturing
debt is 35%, but jumps to 48.13% as the fraction of maturing debt reaches 55%, and
finally increases to 55.61% when the fraction of maturing debt is 75%. This example
conveys a clear message: maturity structure matters for the “debt tolerance” of the
economy. As documented in Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), many emerging
market economies experience “extreme duress at overall debt levels that would seem
quite manageable by the standards of the advanced industrial economies”. As an
example, Argentina defaulted in late 2001 with an external debt-to-GDP ratio of
53.3%. By comparison, Table 1.4 shows that an external debt-to-GDP ratio of 64%
may be sustainable (meaning that the default probability is low), as long as the
fraction of maturing debt is sufficiently small. This result confirms the common
wisdom that excessive reliance on short-term debt is a key factor behind emerging
markets crises.
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Table 1.4: Default Probabilities and Maturity Structures





We conduct 500 rounds of simulations, with 1000 periods per round, and then
extract the last 50 periods in each round to study the limiting distribution of the
model economy. Table 1.5 reports the business cycle statistics generated by the
model and found in the data.
The external debt-to-GDP ratio is computed by dividing Argentina’s external
debt by its GDP from 1993 to 2004 using the debt data from the World Bank.
Seasonally adjusted consumption and current account data from 1993Q1 to 2005Q4
are taken from MECON. Bond spreads are annualized quarterly spreads on 3-year
(short-term) and 9-year (long-term) foreign currency denominated bonds issued by
the Argentine government, taken from Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2005).
Overall, the model accounts for key features of the Argentine economy, includ-
ing volatile consumption, countercyclical current account and bond spreads, and the
relationship between the average short-term and long-term spreads and their relative
volatilities.
The model generates an average debt-to-GDP ratio of 21.16%, which is sig-
nificantly higher than in previous quantitative models of sovereign debt19. This
19For example, Yue (2006) has an average debt service-to-GDP ratio of 9.69%. Arellano and
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Table 1.5: Business Cycle Statistics from the Model and the Data
Statistics Data Model
Average External Debt-to-GDP 64% 21.16%
Consumption Std. Dev./Output Std. Dev. 1.03 1.08
Correlation between CA/Output and Output -0.91 -0.33
Std. Dev. of CA/Output 5.40% 4.21%
Average Long-term Spreads 5.92% 5.3%
Average Short-term Spreads 5.16% 3.77%
Std. Dev. of S-T spreads /Std. Dev. of L-T spreads 1.45 2.02
Correlation between S-T Spreads and Output -0.54 -0.14
Correlation between L-T Spreads and Output -0.66 -0.21
improvement stems from the debt dilution effect in our model. The debt dilution
problem affects the average level of debt through two channels. First, it amplifies
default risk, resulting in a higher frequency of default, as argued in Section 4.1.
With more frequent defaults, the sovereign can sustain a lower level of debt. How-
ever, given that both previous models and this model are calibrated to match the
default frequency in the data, dilution’s impact through the first channel does not
make a difference in the debt-to-GDP ratio of our model relative to previous stud-
ies. Therefore, dilution affects the average debt-to-GDP ratio in this model mainly
through a second channel: it makes capital inflows less procyclical by lowering bor-
rowing costs in recessions and raising borrowing costs in booms, as compared to the
case without dilution. In bad times, new creditors know that they can acquire a
share of the debt recovery value at the expense of existing lenders in a post-default
debt restructuring, and hence new lenders do not charge prohibitively high interest
Ramanarayanan (2006) get an average debt-to-GDP ratio of 7.3%. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006)
obtain an average debt-to-GDP ratio of 20% by assuming a trend shock and a discount factor of
0.8.
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rates, enabling a country near crisis to borrow relatively more than it would be able
to without the dilution effect. In good times, however, dilution risk works in the
opposite direction: creditors lending in long-term instruments may suffer dilution
before the debt matures, so they require higher interest rates to cover the poten-
tial dilution risk, resulting in lower capital inflows to the country. Overall, since
dilution risk is more serious during recessions, its effect of raising debt levels before
crisis outweighs that of lowering borrowing in tranquil times. As a consequence, the
second channel enables the model to support a higher average debt-to-GDP ratio
than those found in previous studies. In section 5, when we compare setups with
different degrees of dilution using the same set of parameter values, dilution works
through both channels and we find that, all else equal, a higher degree of dilution
leads to a lower debt level.
The simulation also matches the consumption volatility observed in the data
at a business cycle frequency. It is a common feature of emerging economies that
consumption is more volatile than output (Neumeyer and Perri (2004)). Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006) and Yue (2006) obtain this result by assuming a stochastic trend
for the output process, implying that output shocks are permanent. In contrast, in
this model, output shocks are transitory and the volatile consumption stream re-
sults from both default risk and dilution risk. The possibility of default tightens the
implicit borrowing constraint in recessions and hence limits the government’s ability
to smooth consumption in bad states. Thus, default risk contributes to the volatility
of consumption. Debt dilution risk, as we have argued above, works through two
channels: increasing default frequency and making capital inflows less procyclical.
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The first effect amplifies default risk, contributing to consumption volatility, while
the second effect helps to smooth consumption. Overall, forces contributing to con-
sumption volatility dominate quantitatively, leading to more volatile consumption
than output.
This model matches the observed countercyclical behavior of the current ac-
count, although the model correlation is less negative than in the data. The ar-
gument is very similar to that for consumption volatility. Default risk makes the
current account more countercyclical by tightening the implicit borrowing constraint
in bad states. The debt dilution effect, on the one hand, makes capital inflows less
procyclical and hence the current account less countercyclical; on the other hand, it
increases the frequency of default, causing more frequent current account reversals
following defaults. Again, the effects contributing to current account countercycli-
cality dominate, so that we get a countercyclical current account in the long run.
The model produces higher average long-term spreads than short-term spreads,
which is in line with data. Long-term spreads are generally higher since they in-
corporate default risks both in the near term and in the future, as well as the
potential dilution risk, reflected in the expected debt recovery rate conditional on
default. Short-term spreads, in contrast, reflect only default risk and the expected
debt recovery rate in the near term. As a result, this model does a better job in
matching average long-term spreads than it does in matching short-term spreads.
But it should be taken into consideration that we assume risk neutral investors,
which lowers average bond spreads for both short and long maturities.
The model captures the relative volatility of short-term and long-term spreads
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observed in the data. Short-term spreads are more volatile than long-term spreads,
because short-term spreads are generally lower than long-term spreads, but near
crises they jump more than long-term spreads do, mainly due to a shift toward
short-term bonds in the maturity structure. Such a shift exacerbates the increase
in short-term spreads, while dampening the increase in long-term spreads.
Finally, the model generates countercyclical bond spreads. Both short-term
and long-term spreads are higher in pre-crisis episodes due to the higher default
risk and debt dilution risk. However, this model misses the magnitudes of both
correlations.
We then proceed to study the bond maturity structures in booms and reces-
sions. Figure 1.3 displays the time series dynamics of both short-term and long-term
bond issuances prior to a default (default occurs in period 21). In plotting this fig-
ure, we take the average over all default episodes in the simulated data of the bond
issuances from 20 to 1 period before default. Therefore, this figure reflects the
general behaviors of bond issuances before default, not just a special case.
It is clear from Figure 1.3 that the government mainly borrows long-term (i.e.,
long-term assets are negative) and occasionally saves short-term (i.e., short-term as-
sets are positive) during normal times (from period 1 to 17). In the pre-crisis episode
(period 18 to 20), both short-term and long-term borrowing increase dramatically,
and the short-term debt rises more sharply than long-term debt, indicating a shift
toward short-term bonds before default.
To see this shift toward short-term bonds more clearly, we classify all non-
default simulation periods into two groups: tranquil periods and turbulent periods.
33











Figure 1.3: Time Series of Bond Issuances Prior to Default
We then compare the maturity structures in each group. Turbulent periods are
defined as the four periods before each default event, and all the remaining non-
default periods are defined as tranquil20. Table 1.6 presents the average levels of
short-term and long-term debt relative to mean output, as well as the ratios of
short-term to long-term debt in tranquil and turbulent periods.
In tranquil times, the government generally has savings in short-term, which
can be interpreted as accumulation of foreign reserves, and mainly borrows long-
term. In turbulent times, the ratios of short-term and long-term debt to mean
output increase to 6.3% and 24.6%, respectively. Such an increase in the debt-to-
GDP ratio in the pre-crisis episode is consistent with recent experience in Argentina:
20We have done a robustness check by redefining turbulent periods as two periods or six periods
before each default event, and the increases in the ratios of average short-term debt to average
long-term debt from tranquil to turbulent periods are significant in both cases. We also tried to
define turbulent periods as those in which bond spreads are high, and we got similar results.
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Table 1.6: Short-Term and Long-Term Debt in Tranquil and Turbulent Times
Tranquil Periods Turbulent Periods
(Ave. S-T Debt(-) or Saving(+))/Mean Output 0.8% -6.3%
(Ave. L-T Debt(-) or Saving(+))/Mean Output -10.6% -24.6%
Average S-T Debt/Average L-T Debt -7.5% 25.6%
its external debt-to-GDP ratio was 53.3% at the time of default in late 2001, which
is well above the average external debt-to-GDP ratio of 38.54% from 1993 to 2001.
In addition, the average ratio of short-term to long-term debt in the simulated
data jumps from -7.5% in tranquil times to 25.6% in turbulent times, indicating an
increase of 33.1 percentage points in the ratio of short-term to long-term debt. Thus,
this model generates a striking shift in maturity structures toward short-term debt
before crisis episodes, as is observed in the data for Argentina and other countries.
Such a shift is an outcome of both default risk and the debt dilution effect. What
fraction of this shift is due to default risk and how much is due to debt dilution? In
the next section, we explore the role of the debt dilution effect in driving the shift
in maturity structure, as well as its impacts on other business cycle variables.
1.5 Debt Dilution, Maturity Structure and Long-Run Effects
In this section, we first study the effects of debt dilution on the maturity struc-
ture by comparing the benchmark model with two alternative setups with different
degrees of dilution. In one setup, we completely eliminate the debt dilution effect,
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leaving only default risk, by assuming a “first-in-time” seniority structure21. That
is, earlier lenders are senior and are repaid first in a post-default debt restructuring.
Later lenders, being junior, only receive repayments after the senior lenders have
been fully repaid. By assuming such a “first-in-time” seniority structure, existing
long-term debt will not be diluted by new debt issuances, since new creditors are
unable to obtain earlier lenders’ debt recovery value. In the other setup, we assume
the exactly opposite seniority structure: “last-in-time”. That is, later lenders are
senior and are repaid before the earlier ones. In this case, we have the maximum
degree of debt dilution, since the new creditors get the maximum amount of the ear-
lier lenders’ debt recovery value. Thus, in terms of the degree of debt dilution, our
benchmark model is an intermediate case, with the “first-in-time” and “last-in-time”
setups being two extreme cases.
To solve the alternative model setups, we change the key assumption in the
benchmark renegotiation problem: bondholders no longer get the same debt recovery
rate. Instead, the debt recovery rate for each bondholder depends on her seniority.
Bond price functions change accordingly to accommodate the relative seniorities of
bond issuances. We solve the alternative setups using the same parameter values
as in the benchmark model, and conduct the same simulation exercises as in the
benchmark case. Again, we separate all simulation periods into tranquil periods
and turbulent ones by defining turbulent periods as the four periods before each
default event and tranquil periods as all remaining non-default periods. Table 1.7
21Bolton and Skeel (2004) propose this seniority structure in order to make debt restructuring
more orderly. We follow them in using the term “first-in-time”.
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presents the ratio of short-term and long-term debt to mean output, as well as the
ratio of short-term to long-term debt in both tranquil and turbulent times in all
three setups.
Table 1.7: Comparison of Setups with Different Degree of Debt Dilution
First-in-time Benchmark Last-in-time
(No dilution) (Moderate dilution) (Max. dilution)
Ave. S-T Debt in Tranquil Periods -0.18% 0.80% 0.20%
Ave. S-T Debt in Turbulent Periods -0.46% -6.3% -8.44%
Ave. L-T Debt in Tranquil Periods -12.24% -10.6% -5.07%
Ave. L-T Debt in Turbulent Periods -26.45% -24.6% -18.22%
Ave. S-T/Ave. L-T Debt in Tranquil Periods 1.46% -7.5% -3.92%
Ave. S-T/Ave. L-T Debt in Turbulent Periods 1.74% 25.6% 46.33%
Changes in Ave. S-T/Ave. L-T Debt 0.28% 33.1% 50.35%
The upper panel of Table 1.7 shows the average ratios of short-term and long-
term debt to mean output in booms and recessions. In turbulent times, the average
ratio of short-term debt to mean output increases from 0.46% in the “first-in-time”
(no dilution) case to 6.3% in the benchmark case (moderate dilution), and increases
even further to 8.44% in the “last-in-time” (maximum dilution) case. Correspond-
ingly, long-term borrowing during turbulent periods decreases as the degree of debt
dilution increases, from 26.45% in the “first-in-time” case to 24.6% in the benchmark
model and finally to 18.22% in the “last-in-time” setup.
To show the shift in maturity structures more clearly, we present the average
ratio of short-term to long-term debt in both tranquil and turbulent times in the
lower panel of Table 1.7. In the “first-in-time” case, the shift toward short-term
debt in turbulent times is entirely driven by default risk and the increase is only
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0.28 percentage points. In the benchmark case, the shift in maturity structure is
driven by both default risk and a moderate degree of dilution, and the ratio of short-
term to long-term debt rises by 33.1 percentage points in turbulent periods. This
comparison shows that the debt dilution effect plays a significantly more important
role than default risk in driving the maturity structure toward short-term debt
before crisis. In the “last-in-time” case, the increase in the short-term/long-term
debt ratio is even larger than in the benchmark case, again confirming our argument
that debt dilution can significantly shift the maturity structure towards short-term
debt before crises.
The table also shows that the possibility of debt dilution affects the govern-
ment’s access to long-term debt even in tranquil times. Without debt dilution,
the government can sustain a ratio of long-term debt to mean output of 12.24% in
booms, while this ratio decreases to 10.6% with a moderate degree of dilution, and
drops to only 5.07% with the maximum dilution. As argued earlier, the possibil-
ity of future dilution drives up long-term spreads and hence discourages long-term
borrowing even in tranquil times.
Table 1.8: Long-run Behaviors of All Setups
First-in-time Benchmark Last-in-time
Default Frequency 0.18% 0.72% 2.92%
Average Debt/Output Ratio 24.93% 21.16% 12.53%
Std. Dev. of Consumption/Std. Dev. of Output 0.87 1.03 1.49
Corr. between CA and Output -0.51 -0.33 -0.15
Finally, in Table 1.8 we compare the long-run probability of default, the av-
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erage debt-to-output ratio and the correlation between the current account and
output in all three setups. In the long run, a larger degree of debt dilution leads to
an increase in default frequency, from 0.18% in the “first-in-time” case to 2.92% in
the “last-in-time” setup. Moreover, the “first-in-time” setup supports the highest
average debt-to-output ratio of 24.93%22, while the “last-in-time” setup can only
sustain an average debt-to-output ratio of 12.53%. Here debt dilution affects the
equilibrium debt-to-output ratio through two channels: by increasing default fre-
quency and by making capital inflows less procyclical, with the first effect decreasing
debt levels and the second increasing them, as shown in Section 4.3. The overall
effect is a lower average debt-to-output ratio with larger degree of dilution. By the
same token, the government is able to achieve smoother consumption streams in
setups with a smaller dilution effect.
Lastly, the current account is always countercyclical, even with the maximum
degree of dilution, confirming our argument in Section 4.3 in explaining the coun-
tercyclicality of the current account. However, we find that a higher degree of debt
dilution effect makes the current account less countercyclical, or the capital inflows
less procyclical. This result suggests that debt dilution can be desirable to some
degree, especially from the perspective of a distressed economy. Debt dilution al-
22Recall that in the “first-in-time” case, the dilution effect is absent and only default risk is in
play. In this sense, the “first-in-time” set-up is similar to standard sovereign default models, such
as Arellano (2007) and Yue (2006). However, the debt-to-GDP ratio reported here is not directly
comparable to those in the standard models because the high debt ratio here is mainly driven
by the low default frequency (0.18% quarterly), much lower than those in the standard models
(e.g., 0.7% quarterly in Yue (2006) and 3% annually in Arellano (2007)). Note that in this paper,
we calibrate the benchmark model, not the “first-in-time” set-up, to match the quarterly default
frequency of 0.7%. If we were to re-calibrate the “first-in-time” case to match the quarterly default
frequency, we should obtain a much lower debt-to-GDP ratio similar to the standard results.
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lows a country near crisis to have more access to new financing, although mainly in
short-term form. The country chooses optimally whether to borrow more in short-
term or to borrow less in long-term. By choosing the former, the government may
be able to postpone the crisis for some time and then default on a larger amount of
debt; by choosing the latter, it might need to default immediately but with a lower
level of defaulted debt. If borrowing more in short-term is the optimal choice, the
sovereign government is willing to pay the price associated with dilution, namely a
higher default probability and larger amount of debt arrears conditional on default.
From this point of view, debt dilution is very similar to default in that both can be
beneficial for a country in distress, even though ex ante they may seem inefficient
and costly.
1.5.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Table 1.9 presents a sensitivity analysis of the benchmark model, considering
different values for the discount factor β and the sovereign’s bargaining power φ.
The upper panel of Table 1.9 reports the sensitivities of default frequency, the
debt recovery rate and the mean debt-to-GDP ratio to different values of the time
discount factor, holding all other parameters fixed at their benchmark values. When
the country is more patient, it defaults less frequently since it cares more about
intertemporal consumption smoothing. Due to a reduced default frequency, a more
patient country can sustain a higher mean debt-to-GDP ratio. Also, with a higher
discount factor, the equilibrium debt recovery rate is higher, because regaining access
to international capital markets is valued more by the government.
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Table 1.9: Sensitivity Analysis for the Benchmark Model
Default Frequency Debt Recovery Rate Mean Debt-to-GDP
Time Discount Factor
β = 0.99 0.72% 38.54% 21.16%
β = 0.98 8.12% 28.77% 17.16%
β = 0.95 17.17% 16.15% 15.44%
β = 0.90 20.91% 9.78% 14.25%
β = 0.85 24.13% 7.17 % 13.74%
Borrower’s Bargaining Power
φ = 0.46 0% N.A.(There is no default) 44.57%
φ = 0.666 0.72% 38.54% 21.16%
φ = 0.86 3.07% 21.95% 7.5%
The lower panel shows the effect of changing the borrower’s bargaining power.
Stronger bargaining power of the government results in a lower debt recovery rate.
Consequently, defaults are not as costly and the government tends to default more
frequently. Both a higher default frequency and a lower debt recovery rate shift the
bond price functions downward, making government borrowing more costly. As a
result, the mean debt-to-GDP ratio decreases as the borrower’s bargaining power
increases.
1.6 Conclusion
The absence of an explicit seniority structure in sovereign debt has been widely
recognized as an important inefficiency in post-default debt restructurings in recent
years. One consequence of this inefficiency is the emergence of the debt dilution
problem. Debt dilution occurs when a country issues new debt that does not improve
the country’s repayment ability proportionally. This newly-issued debt may reduce
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the amount that can be recovered by the existing long-term debt-holders in a post-
default debt restructuring, and thus “dilutes” existing debt. This paper incorporates
the debt dilution problem into a dynamic model of sovereign default and renegoti-
ation to explain a well-documented phenomenon: emerging market economies rely
more on short-term debt as they are approaching crisis. We find that debt dilution
is possible in both booms and recessions, but is more severe as a country’s financial
situation worsens and a potential crisis unfolds. The model also predicts that the
maturity structure plays an important role in determining default probability. For
a given debt stock, the country is more likely to default as the fraction of maturing
debt increases.
We explore the quantitative predictions of the model and find that by intro-
ducing the dilution effect, our model is able to generate a default frequency and
an average debt-to-GDP ratio comparable to those observed in the data, without
assuming unusually high rates of time preference for the sovereign borrower. In con-
trast, previous studies of sovereign debt rely on unusually low discount factors to
generate reasonable default frequencies and to support high debt ratios. Also, the
dilution effect helps the model generate consumption volatility and countercyclical
current account without trend shocks. In addition, the model generates a large shift
to short-term debt before crises; the fraction of this shift due to the “debt dilution”
effect is significantly larger than the fraction due to default risk.
By comparing setups with different degrees of dilution, we find that the di-
lution effect increases the equilibrium default frequency and decreases the average
debt-to-GDP ratio, suggesting that debt dilution can be welfare-reducing in the long
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run. However, this comparison also predicts that the debt dilution effect makes
the current account less countercyclical, or capital inflows less procyclical, which is
beneficial to the borrowing country. These results shed light on a potential time-
inconsistency problem in designing the optimal seniority structure. Ex ante, we
may have incentive to eliminate debt dilution in order to lower the frequency of
default and increase the sustainable debt level. But ex post, when a country’s fi-
nancial situation worsens and it is in urgent need of new financing, debt dilution
can be preferable, since it lowers borrowing costs, enabling a country near default
to borrow more and hence postpone crisis. Thus, an interesting direction for future
research is to investigate how to overcome such a time-inconsistency problem by
designing the debt seniority structure properly.
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Chapter 2
“Beneficial” Delays in Debt Restructuring Negotiations
2.1 Introduction
Many sovereign debt crises were followed by prolonged debt renegotiation pro-
cesses. Table 2.1 presents several episodes of sovereign debt restructurings (including
those under the Brady Plan and some recent cases), and reports the length of delay
experienced in each case as well as the haircut rate agreed upon in the final outcome.
Table 2.1: Cases of Sovereign Debt Restructurings
Countries Episode of Restructuring Delay Length Hair Cut
Negotiation (Months) (Per cent)
18 countries1 08/1982 - 05/1994 141 30 - 35
Argentina 12/2001 - 04/2005 40 65
Ecuador 08/1999 - 08/2000 12 6.5
Pakistan 02/1999 - 12/1999 10 30
Russia 11/1998 - 07/2000 20 69
Sources: Cline (1995), Roubini and Setser (2004) and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005).
1. Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ivory
Coast, Jordan, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Uruguay, Venezuela and
Vietnam.
Such lengthy debt renegotiations are widely regarded as evidences of ineffi-
ciencies1. This paper argues, however, that delays in a debt renegotiation process
may be mutually beneficial for the defaulting country and the debt holders. As
1See Roubini and Setser (2004) for a thorough discussion on the inefficiencies in the existing
debt restructuring procedures and the proposed institutional reforms.
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documented by Sturzenegger (2002), among others, defaults are usually associated
with large output collapses, and few resources are available for repayment following
a default. If a debt settlement occurs immediately after the default, then the “cake”
to be allocated is quite small. However, if the negotiating parties wait until the
economy recovers somewhat to settle the defaulted debt, they may receive higher
payoffs by dividing a larger “cake”. Delays that arise due to this consideration can
therefore be beneficial.
Our argument is based on two important features of the real world: the output
stream is stochastic and no state-contingent debt repayment schedules are available.
In the case of a deterministic output process, the defaulting country and the debt
holders know exactly what the future “cakes” are, and hence they can reach an agree-
ment right after the default. Similarly, when state-contingent repayment schedules
are available, delays are also unnecessary. In the real world, however, the output
process after a default is clearly uncertain: although people may expect the economy
to recover from the crisis, they do not know exactly what the future output stream
will be. Without resort to state-contingent repayment schedules, the negotiating
parties may prefer to wait for more information on the economic recovery to be
revealed, and then decide if the current state is good enough to settle the defaulted
debt.
The main purpose of this paper is to show, quantitatively, that the “waiting-
for-a-larger-cake” consideration can explain the delays experienced by a defaulting
country during the renegotiation process, and that these delays can help explain
the observed volatility of sovereign bond spreads. To this end, the paper constructs
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a dynamic model of sovereign default in which renegotiation is modeled using a
stochastic bargaining game based on Merlo and Wilson’s (1995) framework. The
Merlo-Wilson model extends the Rubinstein (1982) alternating offer game by allow-
ing for a stochastic environment and an option to “pass” by the proposer. These two
extensions lie at the heart of our argument and make the Merlo-Wilson framework a
good one to study the effects of “beneficial” delays. In this paper, the renegotiation
process is modeled as a two-player stochastic bargaining game, the simplest case
in the Merlo-Wilson framework. The game is played as follows: in each period, a
proposer is randomly selected with a constant probability. Based on the current
output state and the defaulted debt level, the proposer can either propose or pass.
If she chooses to propose, then the other player decides whether to accept or to
reject. If the proposal is accepted, then the government repays immediately accord-
ing to the agreement; otherwise, both players enter the next period and the game
repeats. If the proposer chooses to “pass”, then again the players enter the next
period and the game goes on. This is a game with complete information, but delays
may occur in equilibrium whenever the proposer perceives that a better agreement
can be achieved by waiting. Intuitively, given the level of the defaulted debt, if the
current output state is good enough, an agreement can be reached; otherwise, the
proposer chooses to “pass” and thus delays the renegotiation process.
We embed the above debt renegotiation process in a dynamic sovereign debt
model featuring endogenous defaults. This part of the model builds on the recent
quantitative analysis of sovereign default, such as Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arel-
lano (2007) and Yue (2006). In our model, a risk-averse sovereign borrows from a
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group of risk-neutral, competitive international investors using non-contingent, one-
period bonds. Facing a stochastic output stream, the sovereign has the option to
default, which results in exclusion from international capital markets and a propor-
tional output loss. The country can re-enter the credit market through renegotiating
with the creditors over debt reduction and repayment. The debt recovery rate is
endogenously determined in the stochastic bargaining game described above. In
equilibrium, sovereign bonds are priced to compensate creditors for the default risk,
the expected haircut rate and the cost of delays in the renegotiation.
We first characterize the equilibrium “propose/pass” choices made by each
player for all states of output and defaulted debt levels. We find that the identity
of the proposer is irrelevant to the timing of an agreement decision; instead, it
only affects the allocation of the “cake.” For a given defaulted debt level, there
is a threshold output level, under which “pass” is always chosen, and above which
an optimal debt recovery rate is proposed and accepted. Consequently, given the
defaulted debt level, the expected delay length is essentially determined by the
output process.
To investigate the quantitative implications of this model, we calibrate it to
the Argentine economy. Numerical analysis shows that the model can generate an
average delay length comparable to that experienced by Argentina in its most recent
debt restructuring. Furthermore, the model successfully accounts for the observed
volatility of bond spreads without assuming risk-averse creditors. In our model, the
bond spreads capture not only the default probability and the expected hair cut
rate, but also the cost of waiting for an uncertain period of time. The existence of
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delays adds more uncertainty to the renegotiation outcome, and hence contributes
to a larger volatility of bond spreads. In addition, the model simulation accounts for
some key features of Argentina’s business cycles, such as the countercyclical bond
spreads.
Finally, we examine how equilibrium delay length is affected by the properties
of the output profile. We find that when the output shocks are sufficiently persis-
tent (i.e., the autocorrelation coefficient is larger than 0.3), the average delay length
increases in the persistence of shocks. More persistent shocks lead to a slower eco-
nomic recovery following a collapse, resulting in a longer equilibrium delay length.
When the output shocks are negatively correlated (with a large absolute value of
the autocorrelation coefficient), renegotiation agreements are never achieved after
defaults. Although it is least costly for the sovereign to settle the defaulted debt in
a good output state, doing so does not bring much benefit in terms of consumption
smoothing. With negatively correlated output realizations, a good output state
today implies a bad one tomorrow. Even if the sovereign settles the debt today
and regains access to the capital markets, it cannot borrow much to smooth con-
sumption tomorrow due to the high default risk associated with a bad output state.
Consequently, the sovereign will find it optimal to stay in autarky forever after de-
fault. We then explore the effects of output volatility: as volatility increases, the
equilibrium delay length tends to be longer, because a more volatile output stream
implies a smaller probability that a good enough state will be realized. As a result,
the players have to wait longer for a sufficiently large “cake”.
Despite widespread concerns about the prolonged and costly sovereign debt
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restructurings, the existing literature contains few models that can quantitatively
explain the observed renegotiation delays. Yue (2006), for example, models the
debt renegotiation process using a Nash bargaining game, which excludes delays in
equilibrium due to the game’s static nature. Arraiz (2006) combines an empirically
estimated function of debt settlement probability with a sovereign default model
and produces long delays in equilibrium. But those delays mainly result from the
empirical estimation of the settlement probabilities. Our paper, on the contrary,
obtains sufficiently long delays from an explicit model of the renegotiation process.
In a recent paper, Pitchford and Wright (2007) studies renegotiation delays
arising from two inefficiencies : creditor holdout and free-riding on negotiation effort.
They model the multi-creditor renegotiation process as a series of bilateral bargain-
ing games. The resulting average delay length is 7 years for a set of countries, close
to the average delay length of 5 years generated by the present paper for Argentina.
Although Pitchford and Wright (2007) models renegotiations explicitly, they do not
embed the full-fledged game into the sovereign borrowing framework. Instead, the
renegotiation outcomes are taken as parameters when the sovereign makes default
decisions. As a result, their model is unable to capture the interactions between
defaults and debt renegotiations. Our model improves in this aspect by introducing
a dynamic bargaining game into a sovereign default model. Furthermore, delays in
Pitchford and Wright (2007) stem from coordination failures, and hence their results
may depend on the number of creditors used in the quantitative analysis. Delays
in this paper mainly depend on the output profile, so the number of creditors is
irrelevant.
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All the above papers assume explicitly or implicitly that after default, the
country has no access to outside financing and the length of exclusion depends on the
renegotiation process. Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2007), however, assumes that even
if the country is excluded from competitive capital markets, the incumbent creditor,
as a monopolist, may continue to invest (though at an inefficiently low level) and
the length of exclusion is controlled by the lender. Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2007)
shares the same result as this paper: the defaulting country regains access to the
competitive capital markets only after good shocks. But their paper is based on a
different argument: good productivity shocks make the defaulting country’s project
profitable conditional on efficient investments. The monopolistic lender can then
extract more surplus by allowing the defaulting countries to reaccess competitive
markets (i.e., reaccess efficient investments) than by retaining the country under her
monopolistic power (i.e., with underinvestments). They show that this argument can
explain the exclusion from and the returning to competitive capital markets, but the
length of exclusion is not quantitatively examined. Our paper, as explained earlier,
is based on the “waiting-for-a-larger-cake” argument and we show quantitatively
that this argument can generate sufficiently long delays.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We describe the model in
Section 2. Section 3 defines the model’s equilibrium and characterizes its properties.
Model calibration and simulation results are provided in Section 4. In Section 5, we
explore how the output process influences the length of renegotiation delays. Effects
of other parameters are also reported in this section. Finally we offer concluding




This model expands Eaton and Gersovitz’s (1981) framework on sovereign de-
fault by adding a post-default renegotiation process, which is modeled as a stochastic
bargaining game. The game structure is built on Merlo and Wilson (1995).
The model features two types of agents: a small open economy and an infinite
number of international investors. The economy faces a stochastic stream of a non-
storable consumption good yt, drawn from a compact set Y . We assume that the
exogenous endowment stream follows a log-normal AR(1) process:
log(yt) = log(y) + ρ(log(yt−1)− log(y)) + εt, ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε) (2.1)
where y is the mean output. In this economy, a risk-averse government maximizes
the expected lifetime utility of a representative domestic resident. The preferences





where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, and ct denotes consumption in period t.
The period utility function u(ct) is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave,
and satisfies the Inada conditions.
The government can trade with the international investors via non-contingent
one-period zero-coupon bonds. The face value of a discount bond issued in period
t is denoted as bt+1, specifying the amount to be repaid in period t + 1. If bt+1 is
positive, it reflects the government’s saving; otherwise, it is a debt. We denote the
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price of a bond issued in period t as qt+1. This price is determined endogenously in
equilibrium.
When debt matures, the sovereign can either repay the maturing debt or
default. The former option enables the government to trade in the current period and
hence to smooth consumption, while the latter results in two penalties: an exogenous
proportional output loss2 and exclusion from international capital markets during
default. Following default, the borrower initiates a renegotiation on debt reduction
with its debt holders. This post-default renegotiation is a dynamic bargaining game
that determines when an agreement can be reached and how much the sovereign
needs to repay in order to reaccess the capital markets. Once an agreement has
been reached and the reduced amount of debt has been repaid in full, the sovereign’s
reputation is restored and it returns to the international capital markets.
International investors, on the contrary, always commit to repaying their debts.
They are risk neutral and behave competitively in international capital markets.
They can borrow as needed in capital markets at the world risk-free interest rate r,
which we assume to be constant and unaffected by the size of investors’ borrowing
and lending. Investors have perfect information on the country’s asset holdings and
current endowment realizations.
2This assumption is empirically relevant. Sturzenegger (2002), for example, estimates the post-
default output loss using a panel of 100 countries from 1974 to 1999, and finds that “the experience
of the 80s tends to suggest an accumulated 4% drop in output over the immediately following four
years.” To keep the model tractable, we assume that this output loss is exogenous.
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2.2.1 Sovereign Government’s Problem
At the beginning of period t, an endowment shock yt is realized, and the
country inherits an asset position bt and a credit standing st from the last period.
The credit standing can be either good (st = 0), indicating that the sovereign is
current on its debt service, or bad (st = 1), meaning that the economy is in default.
If the current period begins with a good credit standing (st = 0), then the
country either repays the maturing debt or defaults on it. Let V (yt, st, bt) be the
country’s lifetime value function from period t on with the current endowment yt,
credit standing st and existing asset position bt. The value function V (yt, 0, bt) is
then given by
V (yt, 0, bt) = max{V R, V D} (2.3)
where V R is the value function for repaying debt, and V D the one for default. If
the sovereign fully repays the maturing debt, then it can borrow or save by trading
in one-period bonds. Moreover, the government enters the next period with a good
credit standing: st+1 = 0. Thus, the value of repaying debt is given by
V R(yt, 0, bt) = max
bt+1
u(ct) + βEV (yt+1, 0, bt+1) (2.4)
s.t. ct = yt − qt+1(yt, bt+1)bt+1 + bt
where bt+1 is the one-period bond traded in this period, and qt+1(yt, bt+1) is the
corresponding price.
If default is chosen, a proportional output loss γyt and exclusion from the
capital markets ensue. The defaulting government then enters the subsequent period
53
with a bad credit standing and a defaulted debt level, bt+1 = (1 + r)bt. To keep
the model tractable, we use the risk free interest rate r, instead of a bond-specific
interest rate, to compute the present value of the defaulted debt. The term (1+r)bt
captures the opportunity cost to the creditor of not getting repaid on time. The
value function for default, V D, is given by
V D(yt, 0, bt) = u(ct) + βEV (yt+1, 1, bt+1) (2.5)
s.t. ct = (1− γ)yt
bt+1 = bt(1 + r)
If the sovereign starts a period with a bad credit standing st = 1, it stays
in autarky, suffers a proportional output loss and may settle the defaulted debt
through renegotiating with the debt holder on debt reduction. The renegotiation
process is a dynamic game that can last more than one period. In equilibrium, this
bargaining game determines an endogenous debt recovery rate α(y, b) ∈ [0, 1] and
when the agreement on α(y, b) can be reached. Thus, the value of staying in default
and continuing renegotiation from period t on, V (yt, 1, bt), is equal to the expected
payoff that the borrower can get from the bargaining game from period t on. We
denote this payoff as ∆B(yt, bt):
V (yt, 1, bt) = ∆B(yt, bt) (2.6)
The determination of this payoff will be discussed in detail in the debt renegotiation
problem.
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Default is preferable when V D ≥ V R. Thus, we can characterize the default
policy of a sovereign government in good standing by a default set yD(b) ⊆ Y ,
following Arellano (2007). The default set yD(b) is defined as follows
yD(b) = {y ∈ Y : V D(y, 0, b) ≥ V R(y, 0, b)}
This default set specifies a set of endowments, for which default is optimal given the
debt position b. Consequently, we can compute the sovereign’s default probability
in period t+1, θt+1, as the probability that tomorrow’s endowment shock falls in the






2.2.2 Debt Renegotiation Problem
Based on Merlo and Wilson (1995), we model the debt renegotiation problem
as a two-player stochastic bargaining game with complete information. This is a
stochastic bargaining game in that both the endowment process and the identity of
the proposer are stochastic. In each period, a state is realized, which determines
the cake (i.e., the set of possible utility vectors to be agreed upon in that period),
and the proposer is randomly selected. For simplicity, we assume that each player
has a constant probability of being selected as proposer in each period. That is, the
identity of the proposer is independent of the cake size. Let φ denote the probability
that the borrower, B, can propose in a period, and (1−φ) is the probability that the
lender, L, proposes in each period. The frequency with which a player is selected as
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proposer is a parsimonious way to capture the bargaining power acquired through
one’s ability to enjoy the first-mover advantage. The proposer may either propose
a debt recovery rate or pass. If she proposes, then the remaining party chooses
to accept or to reject the proposal. If the proposal is accepted, then the defaulting
country immediately repays its reduced debt arrears, and then enters the next period
with an upgraded credit standing of st+1 = 0 without any outstanding debt. If the
proposal is rejected, a new output state is realized and the game repeats until an
agreement is reached. In the case that the proposer chooses to pass, both players
enter the next period and continue the game.
We now define some basic concepts of the game. A stochastic bargaining game
may be indexed by (C, β, 1
1+r
), where for each endowment state y ∈ Y , C(y) ⊂ R2
is a cake representing the set of feasible utility vectors that may be agreed upon in
that state. β and 1
1+r
are the discount factors for B and L, respectively3. A payoff
function is an element ∆(y) ∈ C(y), where ∆i(y) is the utility to player i, i = B,L.
As in Merlo and Wilson (1995), we focus on a game with stationary strategies,
that is, the players’ actions depend only on the current state and the current offer.
In equilibrium, the proposer’s strategy is to propose when the proposal would be
accepted for sure and to pass otherwise. The other player acts passively: she accepts
when a proposal is made and waits if the proposer passes. Therefore, we can denote
the proposer i’s equilibrium strategy as a simple stopping function τi, with τi =
3Merlo and Wilson (1995) assume that the players have the same discount factor. But they also
mention that “there is no real restriction implied by the assumption that players discount utility
at a common constant rate. So long as the discounted size of the cake converges uniformly to 0.
· · · player dependent discount factors can always be represented by a different cake process with
a common fixed discount factor”. So in our model we allow the borrower and the lender to have
different discount factors.
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0 when i proposes and τi = 1 when i passes; the other player accepts or waits
accordingly. A stationary subgame perfect (SSP) equilibrium is then defined as the
players’ equilibrium stationary strategies τB and τL, and the payoff functions, ∆B
and ∆L, associated with these strategies for player B and L.
We then proceed to characterize the SSP strategies and payoffs. The expected
payoff for the borrower B in period t, E∆B(yt, bt), is given by:
E∆B(yt, bt) = φ∆
B
B(yt, bt) + (1− φ)∆LB(yt, bt) (2.8)
Here the superscript denotes the identity of the proposer. So ∆BB represents the
borrower’s payoff when the borrower himself is the proposer, and ∆LB refers to the
borrower’s payoff when the lender is the proposer.
Correspondingly, the expected payoff for the lender L in period t, E∆L(yt, bt),
is given by:
E∆L(yt, bt) = φ∆
B
L (yt, bt) + (1− φ)∆LL(yt, bt) (2.9)
where ∆BL denotes the lender’s payoff when the borrower is the proposer, and ∆
L
L
refers to the lender’s payoff when himself is the proposer.
First consider the case when the borrower B is the proposer. We refer the
proposed debt recovery rate as αB and the value of proposing as V propB . When B
proposes and the proposal is accepted, the sovereign repays the agreed amount of
debt, αBb, immediately and enters the next period with a good credit standing and
no outstanding debt. Thus, V propB is given by
V propB (yt, bt) = u[(1− γ)yt + α
B
t bt] + βEV (yt+1, 0, 0) (2.10)
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And the lender’s payoff from acceptance, V acptL , is
V acptL (yt, bt) = −α
B
t bt (2.11)
When B chooses to pass, the sovereign stays in autarky, suffers the propor-
tional output loss in this period and then enters the next period continuing the
bargaining game. We denote the value of passing as V passB :
V passB (yt, bt) = u[(1− γ)yt] + βE∆B(yt+1, (1 + r)bt) (2.12)
The lender’s value of rejecting an offer (or waiting) is denoted as V rejtL , which
is given by
V rejtL (yt, bt) =
1
1 + r
E∆L(yt+1, (1 + r)bt) (2.13)
In equilibrium, the proposer B’s strategy is to propose an αB∗ that solves the
following problem
αB∗(yt, bt) = argmaxV
prop
B (yt, bt) (2.14)
s.t. V propB ≥ V
pass
B
V acptL ≥ V
rejt
L
The two constraints specify the set of debt recovery rates acceptable for both players
to settle the debt in the current period. If this set is nonempty, then an agreement
can be reached in the current period. The stopping function τB(yt, bt) = 0, meaning
that the borrower proposes in this period, and the equilibrium debt recovery rate
αB∗ is the smallest element in this set. In other words, the proposer B can extract
extra surplus to the extent that the lender is indifferent between accepting and
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rejecting. However, if this set is empty, then the borrower would choose to pass
(τB(yt, bt) = 1), and hence to delay the renegotiation by one period. This is often
the case when the current endowment is low and the future ones are expected to
be higher. In these circumstances, the borrower is only willing to repay a small
proportion of the debt arrears in the current period, smaller than what the lender
expects to get in the future with a better endowment realization (and when the
lender himself may get to be the proposer). Therefore, there is no debt recovery
rate that the borrower is willing to offer and the lender is willing to accept. In the
end, the borrower just passes and one more period of delay arises.
We now characterize the players’ payoff functions. If αB∗ exists, then the
borrower’s payoff, ∆BB, is the value of proposing,
∆BB(yt, bt) = V
prop
B (yt, bt) (2.15)
And the lender’s payoff, ∆BL , is the value of accepting,
∆BL (yt, bt) = V
acpt
L (yt, bt) (2.16)
Otherwise, the borrower’s payoff is the value of passing,
∆BB(yt, bt) = V
pass
B (yt, bt) (2.17)
And the lender’s payoff is the value of waiting (equivalent to the value of rejecting):
∆BL (yt, bt) = V
rejt
L (yt, bt) (2.18)
Similarly, when the lender is the proposer, we denote the proposed debt re-
covery rate as αLt . The value for the lender to propose an acceptable debt recovery
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rate is V propL , given by
V propL (yt, bt) = −α
L
t bt (2.19)
And the value for the borrower to accept this proposal is V acptB :
V acptB (yt, bt) = u[(1− γ)yt + α
L
t bt] + βEV (yt+1, 0, 0) (2.20)
When L chooses to pass or her proposal is rejected, the value of choosing pass
is denoted as V passL ,
V passL (yt, bt) =
1
1 + r
E∆L(yt+1, (1 + r)bt) (2.21)
And the borrower’s value in this case, V rejtB , is given by
V rejtB (yt, bt) = u[(1− γ)yt] + βE∆B(yt+1, (1 + r)bt) (2.22)
Again, in equilibrium, the proposer L solves the following problem
αL∗(yt, bt) = argmaxV
prop
L (yt, bt) (2.23)
s.t. V propL ≥ V
pass
L
V acptB ≥ V
rejt
B
Similar to our argument above, if the minimum debt recovery rate acceptable
for L is too large for B, then no αL∗ exists, and L chooses to pass (τL(yt, bt) = 1);
otherwise, L proposes and τL(yt, bt) = 0.
When L proposes, the payoffs for both players, ∆LB and ∆
L
L, are given by
∆LL(yt, bt) = V
prop
L (yt, bt) (2.24)
∆LB(yt, bt) = V
acpt
B (yt, bt) (2.25)
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When L passes, the payoffs are:
∆LL(yt, bt) = V
pass
L (yt, bt) (2.26)
∆LB(yt, bt) = V
rejt
B (yt, bt) (2.27)
An SSP equilibrium is a fixed point of the above recursive system(Equations
(7) to (26))4.
2.2.3 International Investors’ Problem
The last part of the model specifies the international investors’ problem. There
is an infinite number of risk neutral and competitive international investors, one of
whom is randomly chosen to trade with the sovereign government in each period.
Investors choose the face value of the bond to maximize expected profits, taking the




where πt is the profit from trading one-period bonds. More explicitly, the expected
profit E(πt) can be expressed as
E(πt) =

qt+1bt+1 − bt+11+r if bt+1 ≥ 0
qt+1bt+1 − 1−θt+11+r bt+1 +
θt+1E(∆L(yt+2,bt+2))
(1+r)2
if bt+1 < 0
(2.29)
When bt+1 ≥ 0, the government saves by purchasing bonds. Since international
investors commit to repaying debts, the government’s saving is risk free. When
bt+1 < 0, the government borrows by issuing new bonds, and default and debt
restructuring are possible future events. In this case, the expected present value of
4Merlo and Wilson (1995) provides a general proof for this characterization of SSP equilibrium
in Theorem 1.
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repayment consists of two terms. The first represents the repayment in the following
period, while the second reflects the expected debt recovery in the case of default.
As noted in the government’s problem, the probability of repayment is (1 − θt+1),
and that of default is θt+1. In the case of default, debt renegotiation begins in period
t + 2. E(∆L(yt+2, bt+2)) is the expected present value of the payoff that the debt
holder can get from the renegotiation game.











if bt+1 < 0
(2.30)
Finally, note that the term − E(∆L)
(1+r)bt+1
is just the expected present value of the
debt recovery rate, which lies in the interval [0, 1], and hence the bond price ranges
from 0 to the price of a risk free bond. Consequently, the interest rates of sovereign
bonds are always higher than or equal to the risk free rate. We define the bond
spread as the difference between the country interest rate and the risk free interest
rate.
2.3 Equilibrium
The recursive equilibrium of the model is defined as follows:
Definition 2 A recursive equilibrium is defined by (i) a sequence of allocations
of consumption c(y, s, b), bond holding b′(y, b) (b′ refers to the bond issued in the
current period and maturing in the next period), and a default set yD(b); (ii) a pric-
ing function q(y, b′); (iii) the borrower’s and the lender’s stopping functions τB(y, b)
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and τL(y, b), debt recovery rates α
B(y, b) and αL(y, b), and the payoffs ∆B(y, b) and
∆L(y, b) such that:
1. Given the pricing function q(y, b′) and the debt renegotiation outcome, the
country’s asset holdings b′(y, b), consumption c(y, s, b), and default set yD(b)
satisfy the government’s optimization problem.
2. Given the bond pricing function q(y, b′), the debt recovery rate αB(y, b), αL(y, b)
and the strategies of both players solve the post-default debt renegotiation prob-
lem.
3. Given the renegotiation outcome and the country’s optimal policy, the bond
pricing function q(y, b′) satisfies the investors’ maximization problem.
2.3.1 Property of the Recursive Equilibrium
We can easily establish the relationship between the identity of the proposer
and the timing of reaching an agreement.
Proposition 3 In a given period with endowment y and defaulted debt b, whether
an agreement can be reached in this period does not depend on the identity of the
proposer.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
This proposition says that in equilibrium, given the endowment realization
and the defaulted debt level, no matter who is the proposer, the proposing/pass
choice would be the same. The intuition is as follows: if the selected proposer,
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say the borrower, can find an allocation that makes both parties at least weakly
better off by agreeing on the proposal than waiting for one more period, then this
allocation is also a feasible choice (but may not be the best one) for the lender
to achieve an agreement as the proposer. Therefore, the identity of the proposer
does not determine when an agreement is achieved; it only affects the allocation
of the “cake” to each player. It is not surprising that being the proposer in an
agreement-reaching period is advantageous: the proposer can extract extra surplus
to the extent that the other player is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the
proposal. Since the identity of the proposer is independent of the state realizations,
the player with a higher probability of being proposer in each period is more likely to
enjoy the first-mover advantage. Thus, the frequency of being selected as proposer
reflects a player’s bargaining power.
2.4 Quantitative Analysis
We solve the model numerically to evaluate the delay lengths that can be
generated by this model.
2.4.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match features of the Argentine economy. We define
one period as a quarter.






where σ is the risk aversion coefficient. This parameter is set to 2, a standard value
in real business cycle studies. We set the parameter of proportional output loss γ
to be 2%, based on Sturzenegger’s (2002) estimate. The quarterly risk-free interest
rate r is set to 1%, following Yue (2006).
As mentioned in the model set up, we assume that the exogenous endowment
stream follows a log-normal AR(1) process:
log(yt) = log(y) + ρ(log(yt−1)− log(y)) + εt, ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε) (2.32)
where y is the mean output and is normalized to 1. The autocorrelation coefficient
ρ and the standard deviation of endowment innovations, σε, are computed from the
quarterly real GDP data of Argentina from 1980 Q1 to 2005 Q4. The GDP data are
seasonally adjusted and are taken from the Ministry of Economy and Production
(MECON). The data are detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing
parameter of 1600. We then construct a discrete Markov representation of the
endowment process as a 51 state Markov chain employing the quadrature procedure
by Hussey and Tauchen (1991).
In the last part of the calibration, we set the sovereign’s time discount factor
β and the sovereign’s probability of being selected as proposer in each period, φ,
simultaneously to match the frequency of default and the average debt recovery rate
using the simulated method of moments (SMM).
Argentina defaulted 4 times from 1824 to 1999 as documented in Reinhart,
Rogoff and Savastano (2003), and then defaulted a fifth time in late 2001. As a
consequence, its long-term quarterly default frequency is about 0.70%. In the last
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25 years (for which the quarterly GDP data are available), however, Argentina has
defaulted twice, once in 1982 and once in late 2001, resulting in an average quarterly
default frequency of 1.92%, much higher than the long-term default frequency. In
this calibration, we set the parameter values to match the short-term default fre-
quency. The reason is that in our model, the default decisions and the equilibrium
delay lengths are interdependent: states in which defaults are chosen largely deter-
mine the renegotiation delay lengths, and the expected delay lengths, in turn, affect
the default decisions ex ante. Moreover, both default decisions and equilibrium delay
lengths are essentially determined by the output process. Given that the available
short series of quarterly GDP data are consistent with a quarterly default frequency
of 1.92%, if we artificially set parameter values to match the long-term default fre-
quency (i.e., 0.7%), then we may get a biased result for the average delay length
in the quantitative analysis. Therefore, we aim to match the short-term default
frequency of 1.92%. The average debt recovery rate in the most recent Argentine
debt restructuring was approximately 35%(Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005)).
Table 2.2: Model Parameter Values
Parameter Value Sources
Coefficient of Risk Aversion σ = 2 RBC literature
Output Loss in Default γ = 2% Sturzenegger (2002)
Risk Free Interest Rate r = 1% Yue (2006)
Std. Dev. of Endowment Innovations σε = 0.047 MECON
Autocorr. Coef. of Endowment ρ = 0.83 MECON
Discount Factor β = 0.96 Matched by Calibration
Borrower’s Probability of Being Proposer φ = 0.60 Matched by Calibration
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Table 2.3: Target Statistics and Model Statistics
Target Statistics Data Model
Default Frequency 1.92% 2.19%
Debt Recovery Rate 35% 38.47%
The time discount factor is found to be 0.96, and the sovereign’s probability
of being proposer, φ, is found to be 0.60. Our calibrated model generates a default
frequency of 2.19% and an average debt recovery rate of 38.47%, which closely
match the corresponding data moments. The calibration results are summarized in
Table 2.2. Table 2.3 compares the targeted data statistics and the model-generated
statistics.
2.4.2 Numerical Results on Equilibrium Properties
In this part, we present some of the equilibrium properties of the model. Figure
2.1 plots the equilibrium default probabilities in the next period for each state of































Figure 2.1: Equilibrium Default Probabilities
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It is clear that default probabilities are higher with lower endowment realiza-
tions today and higher levels of debt tomorrow. Note that a bad endowment shock
today implies a large probability of having a low output level tomorrow, given the
positively autocorrelated output process. So this result supports our argument that
defaults are usually associated with bad output realizations, providing incentives to
wait for a larger “cake” in the post-default debt renegotiations.
We then present in Figure 2.2 the equilibrium propose/pass choices made by
the borrower and the lender for each endowment state and defaulted debt-to-mean
output ratio5. On the vertical axes, “Propose” represents the case that a proposal is
made and accepted, i.e., an agreement is reached. “Pass”, on the contrary, implies



























Propose/Pass Choices by the Lender
Debt−to−Mean Ouput
Figure 2.2: Equilibrium Propose/Pass Choices of the Borrower and the Lender
As a confirmation of Proposition 1, the two graphs in Figure 2.2 are identical,
meaning that for a given endowment state and a defaulted debt-to-mean output
5In the following figures, “debt” refers to the present value of the defaulted debt. Since it may
take many periods to reach a renegotiation agreement, the present value of the defaulted debt
can be much larger than the original level at the time of default. Therefore, we allow the largest
possible defaulted debt-to-mean output ratio to be 200%, which is large enough (i.e., it is never
binding) for our benchmark simulations. Since we use negative numbers to denote debt, the lower
bound of the defaulted debt-to-mean output ratio is -2.0.
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ratio, the borrower and the lender would make the same propose/pass choice no
matter who is selected as proposer.
Furthermore, Figure 2.2 shows the states in which an agreement can be at-
tained. We observe three interesting results from this figure: first, for any given
debt-to-mean output ratio, there is a threshold output level, under which “pass”
is chosen; second, for low levels of defaulted debt (e.g., debt-to-mean output ratios
smaller than 0.3), the threshold output state increases in debt; third, when the de-
faulted debt levels are large enough, the output threshold does not change with the
debt level. The first two results are very intuitive: debt settlements only occur in
sufficiently good output states, and with a higher defaulted debt level, the sovereign
needs a better endowment realization (and hence more available resources) to settle
the debt. We will discuss the third result later, after we present the renegotiated
debt repayment schedules.
We now plot the equilibrium debt recovery rates proposed by each player at
each state (Figure 2.3). In this figure, a zero debt recovery rate implies that the





























































Figure 2.3: Equilibrium Debt Recovery Rates
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In general, the debt recovery rates proposed by the borrower are smaller than
those proposed by the lender. This is because the proposer enjoys the “first-mover
advantage”, which results in lower equilibrium debt recovery rates when the borrower
is the proposer and higher ones when the lender is the proposer. In addition, the
shapes of the two debt recovery schedules are similar: both of them are convex and
decreasing in the defaulted debt level, meaning that a lower level of defaulted debt
results in a much larger debt recovery rate. These debt recovery schedules are also
similar to that obtained from a Nash Bargaining game, except that in the latter
case there is no delay in equilibrium.
Furthermore, we can take a look at the total debt repayments proposed by



























































Figure 2.4: Proposed Debt Repayments
When the proposed debt repayment is zero, it means the proposer passes.
Again, the debt repayments proposed by the lender are generally larger than those
proposed by the borrower. More interestingly, for a given output state, except for
the low defaulted debt region (e.g., the debt-to-mean output ratios smaller than 0.3),
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the proposed repayment does not change with the debt level. In other words, for
any given endowment realization, there is a maximum amount that the sovereign
is willing to repay, regardless of the defaulted debt level. This explains why the
threshold output state is invariant of the defaulted debt level in the large debt
region. And again, this result coincides with that from Nash bargaining, which is
not surprising given that the bargaining structure in this paper is a variant of the
Rubinstein game. Finally, this maximum amount of repayment increases in the
output realization.
2.4.3 Simulation Results
We conduct 500 rounds of simulations, with 2000 periods per round, and then
extract the last 200 periods in each round to study the limiting distribution of the
model economy.
First, we show the ergodic distribution of the equilibrium delay length in
Figure 2.5.















Figure 2.5: Ergodic Distribution of the Equilibrium Delay Length
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Equilibrium delay length ranges from zero to about 160 periods (a period is
a quarter), while falling between 0 and 20 quarters most frequently. The average
delay length, together with other business cycle statistics generated by the model
are reported in Table 2.4. For comparison, we also report the corresponding data
statistics in that table.
The debt service-to-GDP ratio is computed by dividing Argentina’s short-term
debt and debt service for long-term debt by its GDP from 1980 to 2005. The debt
data are taken from the Global Development Finance database of the World Bank.
Seasonally adjusted consumption and current account data from 1980Q1 to 2005Q4
are taken from MECON. Bond spreads are annualized quarterly spreads on 3-year
foreign currency denominated bonds issued by the Argentine government, taken
from Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2005).
Table 2.4: Business Cycle Statistics from the Model and the Data
Statistics Data Model
Average Renegotiation Delay Length (Quarters) 13.3 19.91
Std. Dev. of Bond Spreads 1.72% 1.37%
Average Bond Spreads 5.16% 3.46%
Correlation between Spreads and Output -0.54 -0.51
Debt Service-to-GDP 14.88% 9.28%
Std. Dev. of CA/Output 5.40% 4.00%
Correlation between CA/Output and Output -0.91 0.12
Consumption Std. Dev./Output Std. Dev. 1.03 0.99
The model generates an average delay length of about 20 quarters, slightly
longer than the actual delay length experienced by the Argentine government. This
result suggests that the incentive to wait for a larger “cake” can indeed result in
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long “beneficial” delays in debt renegotiation processes. The simulated average delay
length is a bit too long because of our assumption that the sovereign fully repays
the reduced debt arrears right after the agreement. In the real world, the debt
arrears are not fully repaid in one step; instead, they are restructured or swapped
to new ones, and will be repaid in the future. These debt swap and restructuring
provide some state contingency to the debt repayment schedules, which can shorten
the renegotiation process. In the extreme case with complete market and state-
contingent debt repayment schedules, there would be no delays at all. Therefore,
our result can be considered as the “upper bound” of the beneficial delay length.
The model simulation closely matches the volatility of bond spreads, which has
been hard to explain in the literature. The existing quantitative models on sovereign
default either assume exogenous return to the capital markets without repaying
anything after default (for example, Model I in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and
Arellano (2007)), or use Nash Bargaining to model the debt renegotiation process
(for example, Yue (2006)). In these two cases, the expected length of exclusion
from the capital markets is more or less fixed. In the present model, however, the
expected length of exclusion is uncertain and depends on the defaulted debt level and
the level of output at the time of default. Therefore, the existence of equilibrium
delays adds more uncertainty to the debt settlement outcome and contributes to
the larger volatility of bond spreads. The model-simulated average bond spread
falls below the data statistic, but it is closer to reality than those obtained by other
quantitative analysis of sovereign debt. This improvement stems from both the
higher default frequency that we target and the additional “waiting cost” incurred
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during delays, which reflects the forgone earnings from re-investing the defaulted
debt.
Furthermore, the model captures the countercyclical behavior of the bond
spreads. Bond spreads are higher in bad endowment states due to the higher default
risk and the larger potential “waiting cost” following default. The latter arises
because the players have to wait longer for the economy to recover from a deeper
recession before they can settle the defaulted debt.
The model generates an average debt service-to-GDP ratio of 9.28%, lower
than the data statistic 14.88%. Note that we include both short-term debt and debt
service of long-term debt in calculating the data statistic, while in the model we
only have quarterly (short-term) debt. Therefore, it is not surprising that the the
debt-to-GDP ratio generated by the model is a little lower than that observed in
data.
The model simulation matches the current account volatility, but it fails to cap-
ture the countercyclical behavior of the current ccount. In this model, the sovereign
faces tighter borrowing constraints in recessions than in booms, and therefore has to
rely more on its own savings, rather than outside financing, to smooth consumption
in bad times. Consequently, the sovereign has to save more in booms, resulting in
a procyclical current account.
Finally, the simulation generates a consumption stream that is a little less
volatile than output. It is typical of emerging economies that consumption is more
volatile than output (Neumeyer and Perri (2004)). Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and
Yue (2006) match this fact by assuming a stochastic trend for the output process,
74
implying that output shocks are permanent. The present model has only transitory
output shocks and the sovereign aims to smooth consumption over time. Its ability
to smooth consumption is quite limited due to the potential default risk, so that the
volatility of consumption generated by the simulation is just a little less than that
of output.
2.5 Determinants of Renegotiation Delay Length
In this section, we explore the determinants of equilibrium delay length. As
aforementioned, the most important parameters are those governing the output
process. Hence, we first report the effects of output process on the delay length.
We then examine the influence of other parameters, including the discount factor,
the probability that the borrower is the proposer, the risk-free interest rate and the
proportional output loss following default.
2.5.1 Output Process and Equilibrium Delay Length
In this part, we investigate the effects of output properties on the equilibrium
delay length. Table 2.5 reports the average delay lengths under different values of the
autocorrelation coefficient ρ and the standard deviation of endowment innovations,
σε, holding other parameters at their benchmark values.
The upper panel shows how the delay length varies with the endowment auto-
correlation coefficient. A higher autocorrelation implies more persistent endowment
shocks, and hence slower recovery after default. Therefore, the players have to wait
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longer for a sufficiently large “cake” to materialize. Consistent with this intuition,
our results show that as the autocorrelation increases from 0.35 to 0.99, the renego-
tiation process lengthens from 6.12 to 44.01 quarters on average.
Table 2.5: Delay Lengths under Different Output Processes
Endowment Autocorr. Coef. Delay Length
(Quarters)
ρ = 0.99 44.01
ρ=0.83 19.91
ρ = 0.50 10.39
ρ = 0.35 6.12
ρ ∈ [−0.3, 0.3] ∞
ρ < −0.3 ∞
Std. Dev. of Endowment Innovations
σε = 0.01 12.32
σε=0.047 19.91
σε = 0.2 35.72
σε = 0.25 59.44
When the autocorrelation coefficient is too low in absolute value (i.e., when
ρ ∈ [−0.3, 0.3]), the output process is close to i.i.d. with very small volatility6.
In this case, it is always optimal for the sovereign to stay in autarky forever after
default. Intuitively, when the output stream is not volatile, the benefits of smoothing
consumption can be smaller than the cost of repaying the reduced debt arrears. As
a result, the renegotiation delay length is infinity. When the output realizations
are negatively correlated with large absolute values of ρ (i.e., ρ < −0.3), the output
process is again volatile, but the sovereign still chooses to stay in autarky forever once
6In this exercise, we lower the autocorrelation coefficient ρ, while keeping the standard deviation
of endowment innovations, σε, constant. Since log(y) follows an AR(1) process, its standard
deviation σy = σε/
√
(1− ρ2). As ρ decreases, σy decreases as well.
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it defaults. The reason is that on the one hand, it is least costly to settle the defaulted
debt in good output states, suggesting that the players should reach an agreement
in booms; on the other hand, given the negatively autocorrelated output stream, a
good state today implies a bad one tomorrow. A bad output state tomorrow tightens
the borrowing constraint and limits the sovereign’s ability to smooth consumption.
Therefore, a costly debt repayment does not provide much benefit for the sovereign
in terms of consumption smoothing. In the end, the economy chooses not to settle
the debt even in good states.
The lower panel delivers the effects of endowment volatility on delay length.
The equilibrium delay length increases as the volatility increases. This result is
intuitive: to settle the defaulted debt, we need large positive shocks to materialize.
With a more volatile output stream, it is less likely that a good enough shock will
occur. Consequently, the players have to wait longer after default for a sufficiently
good realization to settle the defaulted debt.
2.5.2 Other Parameters and Renegotiation Delay Length
Table 2.6 shows the equilibrium delay length under different values for the
time discount factor β, the sovereign’s probability of being selected as proposer, φ,
the proportional output loss parameter γ and the risk-free interest rate r.
The upper left panel of Table 2.6 reports the effects of the time discount fac-
tor, holding all other parameters fixed at their benchmark values. Interestingly,
the average delay length does not move monotonically as the time discount factor
changes. The time discount factor affects the equilibrium delay length through two
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Table 2.6: Delay Lengths under Different Parameter Values
Discount Factor Delay Length
(Quarters)
β = 0.99 16.20
β=0.96 19.91
β = 0.85 13.77
B’s Prob. of Being Proposer
φ = 0.90 10.12
φ=0.60 19.91
φ = 0.30 24.29
Interest Rate Delay Length
(Quarters)
r=0.01 19.91
r = 0.05 8.59
r = 0.10 6.51
Output Loss
γ = 0.005 23.96
γ=0.02 19.91
γ = 0.10 8.68
chanels: from the perspective of payoff maximization in the bargaining, a more
patient sovereign is willing to wait longer, since its patience enables it to be at a
stronger position and thus to enjoy a higher payoff; from the perspective of con-
sumption smoothing, however, a more patient government would like to settle the
debt sooner so that it can reaccess the capital markets and smooth consumption in
the future. With a large discount factor (β = 0.99), the second effect dominates
the first one, so the equilibrium delay length is shorter than the benchmark case
(β = 0.96). When the discount factor is small (e.g., β = 0.85), on the contrary, the
first effect dominates, that is, the sovereign cares more about its bargaining payoff,
again resulting in a shorter-than-benchmark delay length. In sum, the equilibrium
delay length is short when the sovereign is very patient, then it is longer as the
sovereign becomes less patient, and finally it is short again when the sovereign is
very impatient.
The lower left panel presents the effect of changing the borrower’s probability
of being selected as proposer. As argued before, this probability captures the bor-
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rower’s bargaining power. Stronger bargaining power of the government results in
a lower debt recovery rate, making it possible for the sovereign to repay the debt
arrears even in a not-so-good state after a shorter period of waiting. Also, settling
the debt sooner brings two benefits: regaining access to the capital markets sooner
and suffering from the output loss for a shorter period of time. Consequently, as the
sovereign’s probability of being proposer becomes larger, the average delay length
is shorter.
The upper right panel delivers the effects of the world interest rate. As the
risk-free interest rate increases, the debt-holder in the bargaining becomes more im-
patient (her discount factor is 1
1+r
). Therefore, she is eager to reach an agreement
and get repaid sooner at the cost of a smaller debt repayment. For the sovereign,
repaying less and settling the debt sooner are also beneficial. Therefore, the equi-
librium delay length is shorter with a higher risk-free interest rate.
Lastly, the lower right panel reports the delay lengths under different values
of post-default proportional output loss. Intuitively, when the loss is larger, staying
in default is more costly, forcing the sovereign to settle its debt sooner. As a result,
the average delay length decreases in the proportional output loss.
2.6 Conclusion
Delays in post-default renegotiations are common in sovereign debt restruc-
turings. Contrary to the common wisdom that delays are costly and inefficient,
this paper argues that delays in reaching a debt restructuring agreement can be
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an efficient equilibrium outcome. This is because delays allow the economy to re-
cover from a crisis, enabling the negotiating parties to enjoy a larger “cake”. To
investigate whether this argument can explain the actual delay length experienced
by emerging market economies, this paper introduces a stochastic bargaining game
with complete information, based on Merlo and Wilson (1995), into an otherwise
standard dynamic sovereign default model. We find that for a given defaulted debt-
to-output ratio, there exists a threshold output level above which an agreement is
reached immediately; otherwise, “pass” is chosen by the proposer and one period of
delay occurs. Therefore, in equilibrium, the players tend to wait when the output
states are bad, and settle the defaulted debt when the economy recovers and better
output states are realized.
Quantitative analysis shows that this model is able to generate a delay length
close to that experienced by Argentina in its recent debt restructuring event. This
result suggests that some delays in the debt restructuring negotiations are bene-
ficial, and we may not need policy reforms to eliminate them. In addition, this
model successfully accounts for the volatility of bond spreads observed in the data
without assuming risk-averse creditors. The larger volatility of bond spreads can be
attributed to the existence of equilibrium delays, which adds additional uncertainty
to the renegotiation outcomes.
Furthermore, we examine how the properties of the output process affect the
length of delays. When the volatility of output innovations is held fixed, the equilib-
rium delay length decreases as the output shocks become less persistent. However,
when the persistence is too low (or when the output states are negatively autocor-
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related), the sovereign prefers to stay in autarky forever after default, resulting in
an infinite delay length. As the volatility of output realizations increases, the equi-
librium delay length increases as well, because a more volatile output profile makes
it less likely that a sufficiently good output will materialize.
This paper is the first in the sovereign debt literature that can quantitatively
generate long “beneficial” delays in debt renegotiation processes. It can be made
more interesting by assuming a production economy instead of an endowment one,
as we do in this paper. In an economy with investment and production, the recovery
path after default becomes endogenous: if the sovereign decides to invest more into
production (and hence sacrifice more of today’s consumption), then the economy
recovers faster; otherwise, the economy may be trapped in recessions for much longer
until some exogenous good shock is realized. In the former case, delays are efficient
in that the economy is relieved from the debt burden at least temporarily and the
government has more resources for investment, which accelerates the economy’s
recovery and provides a much larger “cake” for the players to enjoy. In the latter
case, however, “waiting” may not be worthwhile because it is almost impossible to
predict when a large enough “cake” may materialize and it is quite possible that
it will never appear. In such a model set up, multiple equilibria may exist and




Appendix to Chapter 1
Proof of Proposition 1. The debt renegotiation problem is
α∗(yt, Bt) = argmax∆B(yt, Bt, αt)
φ∆L(yt, Bt, αt)
1−φ
s.t. ∆B(yt, Bt, αt) = u((1− γ)yt + αtBt) + β




∆L(yt, Bt, αt) = −αtBt
∆B(yt, Bt, αt) ≥ 0
∆L(yt, Bt, αt) ≥ 0









Let BR = −αtBt denote the recovered debt repayment. Substituting for ∆B and
∆L, we can rewrite equation (A.1) as follows:





Taking derivative of both sides with respect to BR:
∂LHS
∂BR
= φu′ + φBRu′′(−1) > 0
∂RHS
∂BR
= (1− φ)u′(−1) < 0
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Thus, the left-hand-side of equation (A.2) is an increasing function of BR and the
right-hand-side is a decreasing function of BR. There must exist a unique BR∗ such
that equation (A.2) holds with equality. This BR∗ is the threshold value B. When
Bt ≤ B, equilibrium recovered debt repayment is B. When Bt > B, there is no debt
forgiveness, since α cannot be larger than 1. This case corresponds with ∆B = 0
and ∆L > 0. 





if B ≤ B(y)
1 if B > B(y)
There are 3 possible cases.
Case 1: B1 ≤ B2 ≤ B(y) < 0, that is both |B1| and |B2| are larger than the








Corollary holds for Case 1.




≤ 1 = α∗(y,B2)
Corollary holds for Case 2.
Case 3: B(y) ≤ B1 ≤ B2 < 0. In this case, we have
α∗(y,B1) = α∗(y,B2) = 1
Corollary holds for Case 3. 
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Proof of Proposition 2. We first show that the value function V R(y, 0, B)
is an increasing function of maturing debt BM .
∂V R(y, 0, B)
∂BM
= u′(c∗) > 0
Therefore, V R(y, 0, B1) ≤ V R(y, 0, B2), given that B1M ≤ B2M and B1T = B2T .
In addition, given B1T = B2T , we have α∗(y,B1)B1 = α∗(y,B2)B2 and
V D(y, 0, B1) = V D(y, 0, B2).
If default is optimal for B2M , then V D(y, 0, B2) ≥ V R(y, 0, B2). Combining
all the above results, we have
V D(y, 0, B1) = V D(y, 0, B2) ≥ V R(y, 0, B2) ≥ V R(y, 0, B1)
So default is also optimal for B1M . Proposition 2 is thus proved. 
Computation Algorithm
We discretize the spaces of asset holdings and endowment. The limits of the
asset space and endowment space are set to ensure that they do not bind in equilib-
rium and large deviations of shocks are possible. We approximate the distribution
of endowment shocks with a discrete Markov transition matrix using a quadrature
based procedure (Hussey and Tauchen (1991)). Then we employ the following algo-
rithm:
I. Guess an initial debt recovery rate. Our guess is α0 = 1.
II. Guess an initial price for short-term and long-term bonds. Our guesses are







III. Guess an initial value for the value function. Our guess is 0.
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0, we solve the coun-
try’s optimization problem when it repays maturing debt. We use Bellman equation
iteration to find the value function V R0 and the optimal choices for assets. To allow
the asset decision rule to be chosen off grid nodes, we use bilinear interpolation to
fill in the off-grid values of the value function. We then compute the value function




0 , we are able to obtain the government’s
default decisions for all y and B. We also obtain the default set by finding the
cut-off endowment shock at which V R0 = V
D
0 .
V. If the newly-obtained value function is close enough to the old one (we use
a numerical tolerance of 10−4), then proceed to the next step; otherwise, return to
step IV using the new value function. Iterate the value function until convergence
is obtained and then proceed to step VI.
VI. Given the converged default set and the initial guess of the recovery rate,
we compute the new short-term and long-term prices qs1 and q
l
1 according to the
international investors’ problem. If the new prices are sufficiently close to the old
ones, stop iterating on prices and continue; otherwise update the price functions
using an adaptive successive over-relaxation (ASOR) procedure that combines data
from iterations i and i-1, as described in Mendoza and Smith (2002). Then repeat
step IV and V using the new price functions and iterate until prices converge.
VII. Given the converged prices and value functions, solve the Nash bargaining
problem for the new debt recovery rate α1 by the Newton method. If the new
recovery schedule is sufficiently close to the old one, we stop iterating; otherwise,
we return to step IV.
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To accelerate convergence, we follow Chow and Tsitsiklis (1991) in that we
start with a coarse grid and solve the whole problem, then we refine the grid with




Appendix to Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose B is the proposer in the current period,
then the equilibrium debt recovery rate is determined as follows
αB∗(y, b) = argmaxV propB (y, b) (B.1)
s.t. V propB (α
B∗(y, b))α ≥ V passB (α
B∗(y, b))
V acptL (α
B∗(y, b)) ≥ V rejtL (α
B∗(y, b))
If no such debt recovery rate αB∗ exists, B chooses to pass.
So in equilibrium, if B chooses to propose, the debt recovery rate αB∗ ensures






L . Then what would L do if she is the proposer in
the current period? In this case, there is at least one debt recovery rate that makes
“proposing” better than “pass” for the lender himself. This debt recovery rate is
just αB∗, and the value of proposing is equal to V acptL above and the value of pass
is the same as V rejtL above. Given that V
acpt
L (α
B∗) ≥ V rejtL (αB∗), when the lender is
the proposer, “proposing” would also be chosen.
If the proposer B chooses to wait, it means there is no αB∗ satisfying V propB ≥




L . In these circumstances, if the identity of proposer is
changed to be the lender, then the lender cannot find a feasible debt recovery rate
to settle the debt either. Therefore, the lender would also choose “pass”.
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When the lender is the real proposer, we can show the same thing by the logic
above. Thus, Proposition 1 holds.
Computation Algorithm
We discretize the spaces of asset holdings, defaulted debts and debt recovery
rates using three 201-point grids. The limits of the asset space are set to ensure
that they do not bind in equilibrium. The space of defaulted debts is set to be
[−2, 0], and the lower bound is never hit in simulations. The debt recovery rate has
an upper bound of 1 and a lower bound of 0. The limits of endowment are set to
be ten standard deviations above and below the mean output, which is normalized
to 1. We then approximate the distribution of endowment shocks with a 51-point
Markov chain using a quadrature based procedure (Hussey and Tauchen (1991)).
Then we employ the following algorithm:
I. Guess initial payoffs for the sovereign and the debt holder. Our guess is
∆B0 = ∆L0 = 0.




III. Guess an initial value for the value function. Our guess is 0.
IV. Given the initial guesses of ∆B0, value function, and q0, we solve the
country’s optimization problem when it repays maturing debt. We use Bellman
equation iteration to find the value function V R0 and the optimal choices for assets.





we are able to obtain the government’s default decisions for all y and b. We also
obtain the default set by finding the cut-off endowment shock at which V R0 = V
D
0 .
V. If the newly-obtained value function is close enough to the old one (we use
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a numerical tolerance of 10−5), then we proceed to the next step; otherwise, return
to step IV using the new value function. Iterate the value function until convergence
is obtained and then proceed to step VI.
VI. Given the converged default set and the initial guess of the lender’s payoff
∆L0, we compute the new price q1 according to the international investors’ problem.
If the new price is sufficiently close to the old one, stop iterating on price and
continue; otherwise update the price function, repeat step IV and V using the new
price function and iterate until price converges.
VII. Given the converged price function and value function, solve the stochastic
bargaining game as follows:
(i) When B is the proposer, we first calculate the value of “pass” by B, and
then the value of rejecting (equivalent to waiting) by L. These values do not depend
on the proposal made by B. We then start a grid search of the debt recovery rate
from the lower bound and calculate the value of “proposing” corresponding to each
debt recovery rate. Once we find the maximum debt recovery rate that ensures the
value of proposing to be larger than, or equal to the value of pass, stop the grid
search and record this maximum debt recovery rate. We then calculate the values
of accepting by the lender for each debt recovery rate from the lower bound to the
maximum one we have just recorded, and find the smallest one that makes accepting
(at least weakly) better than rejecting. For some y and b, such debt recovery rate
exists; for the others, no such debt recovery rate exists. Thus, we record the debt
recovery rate in the former case and let αB = 0 in the latter case to denote the choice
of pass. Based on the newly found borrower’s choices of “proposing” and ”pass”
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and her debt recovery function, we update the borrower and the lender’s payoffs.
(ii) When L is the proposer, we follow the same algorithm as in VII(i) except
that we first find the minimum debt recovery rate the lender would propose and then
do a grid search from this minimum debt recovery rate to the upper bound and find
the maximum one in this set that ensures the borrower to accept the proposal.
In this step, we can also find the “proposing/pass” choices of the lender and the
equilibrium debt recovery function. We then update the payoff functions again. If
these payoff functions are sufficiently close to the earlier ones, we stop iterating;
otherwise, we return to step IV and redo the whole process using the new payoff
functions until convergence is achieved.
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